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George R. Shockey, Jr.**
Under the international legal system, enforcement does
not necessarily follow authoritative decision. In contrast with
the structure of national legal systems, international decision-
making processes typically do not take place within a system
that offers institutionalized assurance of bringing about com-
pliance. Uncertain enforcement of international decisions re-
duces the incentive to comply in particular cases. Possible
failure of enforcement moreover undermines expectations of ef-
fectiveness and authority which are fundamental aspects of any
regime of law. On the international plane enforcement action
may imply the resort to coercive measures of a possibly violent
nature. It may therefore entail the threat of an armed con-
frontation between enforcer, or enforcement agency and the
party against whom the international decision is to be made
effective. The choice of the proper enforcement strategy will
thus depend on a balanced assessment of the probability of ef-
fectiveness and the maintenance of peace associated with the
particular alternative courses of acticn available in a given
situation.I
One strategy open to the implementation of international
decisions is the recourse to national courts.2 Recent action by
* Copyright retained by George R. Shockey, Jr., 1976.
** B.A. Washington University; M.Phil. Yale University;
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1. W. Reisman, Nullity and Revision 637-51, 655-7, 660-
70 (1971), Reisman, "Sanctions and Enforcement," In The Future
of the International Legal Order (vol.3) 273,300-35 (C.Black and
R. Falk eds. 1971). The general theoretical framework was out-
lined in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision," 19 J. Legal Ed. 253, 403
(1967). On the problem of compliance, see Higgins, "Compliance
with United Nations Decisions on Peace and Security and Human
Rights Questions," in The Effectiveness of International Deci-
sions 32 (S. Schwebel ed. 1971); Schachter, "Towards a Theory of
International Obligation," ibid. 9.
2. W. Reisman, Nullity and Revision 802-35 (1971);
E. Nantwi, The Enforcement of International Judicial Decisions
and Arbitral Awards in Public International Law 143-5 (1966);
Lauterpacht, "Implementation of Decisions of International Or-
ganizations through National Courts," in The Effectiveness of
International Decisions 57 (S. Schwebel ed. 19711.
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the United Nations Council for Namibia directly raises the
possibility of using national courts as enforcement agencies.
The territory of Namibia, formerly known as South West
Africa,3 has remained under the control of the Republic of
South Africa despite various decisions by United Nations organs
asserting the Illegality of South Africa's continued presence
in Namibia.4 In 1974, the Council for Namibia, the United Na-
tions agency responsible for that territory, passed the Decree
on the Natural Resources of Namlbla.5 According to this Decree,
title to any natural resource taken from Namibia without the
consent of the Council is not valid, and resources taken without
consent from the territory are subject to forfeiture to the
Council. The Decree is thus aimed at indirectly terminating
South African control over Namibia by denying the Republic essen-
tial attributes of its economic control over the territory.
The stakes in the Namibia controversy are high. The is-
sue of continued foreign domination over Namibia has to be seen
in the context of flagrant violations of basic human rights
that have occurred under the South African regime. Attempts to
implement apartheid In Namibia are only an extreme example.
6
3. The United Nations changed the name to conform with
the usage current among liberation groups. G.A.Res. 2372, 22
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 1, U.N. Dec. A/6176/Add.1 (1968).
4. See TAN 73-80 infra.
5. Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia; Addendum
to the Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 24A, at 27-8, U.N. Doc. A/9624/Add. 1 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Natural Resources Decree,-text In Appendix].
The Decree was endorsed in G.A.Res. 3295, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31,
at 106, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975). See TAN 242-4 Infra.
6. General Assembly and Sec-r-ity Council re'solutions
dealing with Namibia have rested on findings of human rights
deprivations and a threat to internal and world peace. See e.J.,
G.A.Res. 3295, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 106, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); G.A.Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/6716/Add.l (1968); G.A.Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); S.C. Res. 282, 25 U.N. SCOR 1549th meet-
ing (1970); S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1529th meeting (1970);
S.C. Res. 264, 24 U.N. SCOR, 1465th meeting (1969). The Reports
of the United Nations Council for Namibla specify human rights
violations and violence in the territory. 22 U.N. GAOR, Annexes,
Agenda Item No. 64, U.N. Doc. A/6897 and A/7088 (1967); 23 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 64, U.N. Doc. A/7338 (1968);
"Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia," 24 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 24, at 20-5, U.N. Doc. A/7624/Rev.! (1970); Id., 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 24, at 33-5, U.N. Doc. A/8024 (1970); Id-, 26 U.N.
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Implementation of the Council's Decree in national courts con-
sequently also represents a strategy that aims at the realiza-
tion of the enjoyment of, and respect for, fundamental human
rights in Namibia, as well as of the principle of self-
determination.
Deprivations of basic human rights have long been a
principal and legitimate concern of international law. The
United Nations since its inception has recognized the primacy
of human rights in the contemporary world. 7 The U.N.
GAOR Supp. 24, at 15-31, 45-87, U.N. Doc. A/8424 (1971); Id.,27
U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 3-17, 49-50, U.N. Doc. A/8724 (1972T; Id.,
28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 6-28, U.N. Doc. A/9024 (1974); Id., 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 2-29 (vol. I), 11-16 (vol. II), U.N. Doc.
A/9624 (1975). These issues have been explored in hearings be-
fore the United States Congress. "Hearings on Critical De-
velopments in Namibia Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs," 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), [herein-
after cited as "Hearings on Critical Developments In Namibia"];
"Hearings on Human Rights in Africa" before the Subcomm. on In-
ternational Organization and Movements of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited
as "Hearings on Human Rights in Africa"]. For further documenta-
tion, see Anti-Apartheid Movement, Racism and Apartheid in
Southern Africa 142-5 (1974); International Congress on South
West Africa, South West Africa: Travesty of Trust (R. Segal &
R. First eds. 1967); L. Lazar, Namibia 26-33 (1971); A. Lowen-
stein, Brutal Mandate (1962); L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal, Interna-
tional Protection of Human Rights 415-18, 423-30, 441-59, 496-
504 (1973); J. Wellin ton, South West Africa and its Human Issues
270-422 (1967); Rogers, "Namibia: Economic and Other Aspects," in
2 The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa 117 (0. Stokke &
C. Widstrand eds. 1973); Namibia News (a periodical published in
London by the South West African People's Organization of Namibia
- SWAPO); see generally T. Dugard, The South West Africa/Namibia
Dispute (197-7)3.
7. For a summary of significant United Nations activities
in this area, see H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human
Rights 145-312, 394 434 (1968);'A. Robertson, Human Rights in the
World 23-50, 80-110 (1972); L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal, supra note
,at505-997; 13 Whiteman, Digest of International Law---61--79
(1968). A more comprehensive analysis of the human rights pro-
gram, with special attention to its implications for the United
States can be found in McDougal & Leighton, "The Rights of Man in
the World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Ac-
tion," in Studies in World Public Order 335-50, 356-72, 392-403
(1960); McDougal & Bebr, "Human Rights in the United Nations,"
58 Am.J.Int'l L. 603 (1964).
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Charter,8 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,9 and var-
ious other resolutionslO reflect and clarify widely held basic
values. Regional organizations have issued similar statements.''
International adjudications,12 expressions of states, 13 and
8. .fA., U.N. Charter preamble, art. 1, para. 3, art. 13,
para. 1(b), arts. 55, 56, 62, 68, 73, 76.
9. G.A.Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
10. See e.g., "International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural RightS'and "International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights," G.A.Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49,
53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); "Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination," G.A.Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 15, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); "Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,"
G.A.Res. 1514 (XV); 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960). For an enumeration of other covenants and multi-
lateral treaties indicating United Nations concern with human
rights, see 13 Whlteman, Digest of international Law 673-4 (1968).
11. See .. , European "Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1953);
"Charter of the Organization of American States," 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 3 (1951). On regional protection, see I. Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law 557-8 (2d ed. 1973);
A. Robertson, supra note 7, at 51-79, 111-161; L. Sohn &
T. Buergenthal, supra note 6, at 999-1374, 5 Whiteman, Digest of
International Law 230-6 (1965).
12. See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa on Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 57 [hereafter cited as Namibia
Opinion]; cf. Barcelonia Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd.
(Belgium v--Spain), 11970] I.C.J. 3. The protection of human
rights in international adjudication is not limited to cases be-
fore the International Court of Justice or its predecessor. A
discussion of relevant tribunals and cases is in I. Brownlie,
supra, note 11 at 558.
13. For example, United States policy statements con-
cerning Namibia have frequently emphasized American concern re-
garding human rights deprivations. See TAN 82-3 Infra.
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scholarly commentary'14 support the emerging law of human rights
as prescriptions that envision a wider sharing of political,
economic and social values by all persons. 15 -
Within the abstract and broad range of human rights
goals,1 6 certain demands have particular relevance to the post-
war decolonization process. Foremost among these ranks the
right of self-determination which in the specific anti-colonial
context,17 has gained worldwide acceptance partially as a re-
sult of the increased awareness of human rights.
Finally, enforcement of the Council's Decree may well
serve the interests of international peace and security. South
African domination of Namibia undgubtedly constitutes a threat
to the maintenance of world peace! in that the denial of human
rights by any state clearly creates the potential for internal
turmoil.19
Within the context of contemporary expectations and in-
tercommunication, such deprivations could pose a threat to in-
ternational peace.2 0 Resistance to South African control ex-
ists within Namibia, and has often been violent.2 1 The remark-
ably uniform worldwide opposition to the current situation in
14. See e.g., McDougal, "Human Rights and World Public
Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying
General Community Policies," 14 Va.J.Int'l L. 387 (1974) (here-
inafter cited as McDougal, "Principles of Content and Procedure")
(see App.I for an enumeration of human rights claims); McDougal,
Lasswell & Chen, "Human Rights and World Public Order: A Frame-
work For Policy Oriented Inquiry," 63 Am.J.lnt'l L. 237 (1969).
15. McDougal, "Principlesof Content and Procedure" 398.
16. On the. necessarily abstract and comprehensive na-
ture of human rights claims, see id. at 390; see also
I. Brownlie, supra note 11, at 553-4.
17. I. Brownlie, supra note 11, at 575-8; Note, "The
United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions,"
82 Yale L.J. 533, 535-43 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Note,
"Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions").
18. See generally, Howe,"War in Southern Africa," 48
Foreign Affairs 150 (1969).
19. See e.g., G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma 558-69
(1944).
20. For example, the United Nations established the
connection between alleged "internal" deprivations of human
rights and a threat to international peace when it imposed
sanctions against Rhodesia. The propriety of international
action against human rights deprivations was analyzed in
McDougal & Reisman,"Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawful-
ness of International Concern," 62 Am.J.Int'l L. 1,5-13 (1968).
21. See sources cited note 6 supra.
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Namibia expressed in the United Nations and elsewhere,2 2 the ex-
istence of groups and individuals seeking to change that situ-
ation, 2 3 and the relative intransigence of South Africa have cre-
ated an atmosphere In which major military operations potentially
endangering world peace have become entirely conceivable.
This essay explores the possibility of enforcing the
Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia through litigation in
United States courts. The obvious primary issues Involved are the
legal status of the territory of Namibia and of the Council for
Namibia, and the United States policy toward Namibia. The courts
must determine whether the Council for Namibia or an appropriate
substitute can be a plaintiff. What will have to be discussed
here at some detail, is the American act of state doctrine which
could serve as a complete defense against Inquiry into the valid-
ity of the title to resources removed under authorization from
the South African administration. Finally, assuming a proper
plaintiff and the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine,
a court would presumably require some guidance In ruling on the
merits of the case. The desirability and effectiveness of liti-
gation based on the Council for Namibia's claims are consequent-
ly evaluated In accordance with the goals of minimum order and
human rights.
22. For example, only Portugal and South Africa opposed
the General Assembly resolution terminating legitimate South
African control over Namibia. France, Malawi, and the United
Kingdom abstained. G.ARes. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
23. See, "Report of the United Nations Council for
Namibia," 24T.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 3-17, 26-32, U.N. Doc.
A/7624/Rev.1 (1970); Id., 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 1-32, 40-9,
U.N. Doc. A/8024 (197-T; Id., 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 1-14,
22, 32-42, 49-87, U.N. Doc. A/8424 (1971); Id., 27 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 24, at 3-9, 18-44, 51-52 (Vol. I), l-16" (Vol. II), U.N.
Doc. A/8724 (1972); Id., 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 6-13, 29-83,
106-117, U.N. Doc. A7-024 (1974); Id., 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at
2-16, 30-60 (Vol. I), 1-10, 17-38 -(Wol. I), U.N. Doc. A/9624
(1975). The preceding reports contain the best compilation of
recent action by all agencies of the United Nations, member
states, liberation groups operating within and outside of the
territory, and other entities. An examination of the reports
would illustrate the range of activities. See also, "The
Liberation of Namibia," in 1 The UN-OAU Con-fnceon Southern
Africa 117-24 (0. Stokke & C. Wldstrand eds. 1973).
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I. The United Nations and Namibia
A. The Legal Status of Namibia
South Africa took control over South West Africa from
Germany during World War 1.24 After the war the victorious
Allies decided that South West Africa would be governed under
a League of Nations Mandate with South Africa designated as the
Mandatory power. By accepting the Mandate, South Africa became
the legitimate government of the territory, limited by certain
obligations inherent in the Mandate System.2 5 The League took
the position that while the Mandate territories were unable to
govern themselves, ". . . the well-being and development of
such peoples form[ed] a sacred trust of civilization. ... 26
The Mandatories were to undertake this responsibility "... on
behalf of the Leagqe."27 By prohibiting the annexation of Man-
date territories, requiring periodic reports to the League,2 9
and emphasizing the sacred trust concept, the Mandate System es-
tablished the supervisory role of the League.30 The League did
supervise South Africa's somewhat unsatisfactory administration
24. R. Imishue, South West Africa - An International
Problem 1-2 (1965); J. Wellington, supra note 6, at 255; Bley,
"Genesis: From Conquest to Mandate," in South West Africa:
Travesty of Trust 35 (R. Segal & R. First eds. 1967).
25. On the establishment of the South West African Man-
date, see R. Imishue, supra note 24, at 2-19; J. Wellington,
supra note 6, at 256-69; Louis, "The Origins of the Sacred
Trust," in South West Africa: Travesty of Trust 54 (R. Segal &
R. First eds. 1967); Mondlane, "From Mandates to Trusts," in
South West Africa: Travesty of Trust 267-75 (R. Segal & R. First
1967). On the Mandate system, see L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal,
supra note 6, at 337-73; 1 Whiteman, Digest of International Law
5 73 (1963). The text of the Mandate for South West Africa
is reprinted in "Terms of League of Nations Mandates," U.N. Doc.
A/70, No. 10 (1946).
26. League of Nations Covenantart. 22, para. i.
27. Id., para. 2.
28. Advisory Opinion on International Status of South
West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128, 131-2.
29. This duty was specified in Article 6 of the South
West Africa Mandate.
30. Note, "Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions,"
535-8.
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of South West Africa until 1940.31
Much of the legal controversy over South West Africa
after World War If can be traced to ambiguities surrounding
the transition from the League to the United Nations. 32 The
fundamental source of contention has been the role of the
United Nations in the administration of the former Mandates.
Although the League supervision clearly ended, the termination
of the League and the establishment of the Trusteeship System
left unresolved several issues: the survival of the Mandates
after the League, the obligation to enter into trusteeship agree-
ments, and the exercise of United Nations supervisory powers
over the Mandates.33 The International Court of Justice dealt
with these questions in a series of advisory opinions concern-
ing South West Africa.34 The International Court ruled that
the Mandate survived the League and that South Africa's obliga-
tions under the Mandate remained in force. Furthermore, all of
the supervisory functions of the League were to be exercised by
the United Nations. The international status of the territory
could not be modified without the consent of the United Na-
tions. 35 Although the International Court indicated that League
actions should serve as a model future supervisor,36 it never-
theless found that the United Nations was not limited to the ex-
act procedures37 and practices38 of the League. In any event
31. R. Imishue, supra note 24, at 7-19; E. Landis,
Namibla: The Beginnings of Disengagement 3 (1970); J. Wellington,
supra note 6, at 270-319.
32. See League of Nations Off. J., spec. supp. 194, at
58 (1946).
33. R. Imishue, sp note 24, at 20-33. A. Obozuwa,
The Namibian Question 54-9271973).
34. The interpretation of the International Court
opinions was suggested by Note, "Self-Determination and the
Namibia Opinions" 536-8, 546-8.
35. Advisory Opinion on the International Status of
South West Africa [1950] I.C.J. 128, 143-4.
36. Id. at 138. The 1950 opinion also confirmed the
jurisdiction of the International Court to hear disputes con-
cerning the interpretation of the Mandate. Id. at 143. This
power was granted to the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice under Article 7 of the Mandate for South West Africa.
37. Advisory Opinion on South West Africa - Voting Pro-
cedure, [1955] I.C.J. 67, 76-8.
38. Advisory Opinion on the Admissibility of Hearings
of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, [1956]
I.C.J. 23, 29-32.
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the opinions clearly established United Nations authority to
supervise South African administration of the Mandate.3 9
General dissatisfaction with South African control among
the world community existed in the background of these first
three advisory opinions. 40 In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia in
their capacity as former members of the League brought conten-
tious suits in the International Court which directly raised the
issue of South Africa's performance of its obligations under the
Mandate and failure to accept United Nations supervision. Al-
though the International Court decided that it could hear the
merits of the dispute,4 1 it subsequently held that Ethiopia and
Liberia lacked the standing necessary to raise the issue,4 2 be-
cause the right to supervise the Mandates belonged to the League,
not to its members.4 3
Responding to the International Court's failure to render
a decision on the performance of the Mandate obligations,l4 the
United Nations took a series of steps designed to end South Afri-
can control over Namibia. 45 The General Assembly adopted reso-
39. Note, "Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinion,"
536, 546.
40. See e.g., Namibia Opinion 43-5; Written Statement of
the Secretary General, 1 Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings 92-9
(1970); R. Imishue, supra note 24, at 28-63; A. Obozuwa, supra
note 33, at 93-101.
41. South West Africa Cases Preliminary Objections,
[1962] I.C.J. 319, 347.
42. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, Judgment,
[1966] I.C.J.4, 28-9, 347.
43. Id. at 28-9.
44. No-te, "Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinion,"
554; see A. Obozuwa, supra note 33, at 129-47. E. Landis,
"South West Africa Cases: Remand to the United Nations," 52
Cornell L.Q. 628 (1967).
45. The territory was renamed by the United Nations,
G.A.Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6176/
Add.] (1968). A detailed discussion of United Nations activity
concerning Namibia after the 1966 advisory opinion is beyond the
scope of this essay. For the most complete summary, see Review
of the Proceedings of the General Assembly and of the Security
Council relating to the Termination of the Mandate for Namibia
and Subsequent Action (submitted to the International Court of
Justice on Behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions), I Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings 123-202 (1970). See
also Dossier transmitted by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, 1 Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings 9-24 (1970) (this
list of documents indicates the full range of United Nations
activity after the 1966 opinion).
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lution 2145(XXi) in 1966,46 which declared that South Africa had
failed to fulfill its obligations under the Mandate, and had dis-
avowed the Mandate.47 Accordingly, the General Assembly decided:
. . . that the Mandate conferred upon His
Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his
behalf by the Government of the Union of
South Africa Is therefore terminated, and
that South Africa has no other right to ad-
minister the Territory and that henceforth
South West Africa comes under the direct
responsibility of the United Nations;
. . . that in these circumstances the United
Nations must discharge those responsibilities
with respect to South West Africa, 48
South Africa did not accept the termination of the Mandate under
resolution 2145 (XXI). Indeed, South Africa continued to solid-
ify its control over the territory and suppress human rights
contrary to the wishes of the United Nations. The Security
Council responded with a seri s of resolutions condemning the
South African administration.49 In Resolution 276 it:
Declare[d] that the continued presence of the
South African authorities in Namibia is Il-
legal and that consequently all acts taken
by the Government of South Africa on behalf
of or concerning Namibia after the termina-
tion of the Mandate are illegal and Invalid.
Call[ed] upon all States, particularly those
which have economic and other interests in
Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with
46. G.A.Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966). For the history of Res. 2145, see Review
of the Proceedings, supra note 45, at 123-46.
47. G.A.Res. 215, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2,q 3,U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
48. Id.q 4,5. For a discussion of the legal issues
raised by the termination, see A. Obozuwa, supra note 33, at 1-53.
49. S.C.Res. 245, 246, 23 U.N.SCOR, 1397th meeting 1,2
(1968); S.C.Res. 264, 24 U.N.SCOR, 1465th meeting 1 (1969); S.C.
Res. 269, 24 U.N.SCOR, 1497th meeting 2 (1969); S.C.Res. 276,
25 U.N.SCOR, 1529th meeting 1 (1970); S.C.Res. 282, 25 U.N.SCOR,
1549th meeting (1970); S.C.Res.283, 284, 25 U.N.SCOR, 1550th
meeting (1970); see Review of the Proceedings, supra note 45,
at 160-201.
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the Government of South Africa which are incon-
sistent with . . . this resolution.50
The Security Council subsequently requested an advisory opinion
from the International Court on ". . the leqal consequences
for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia,
notwithstandinq Security Council resolution 276 (1970) . . 5i
The 1971 advisory opinion affirmed the authority of the
United Nations over Namibia. 52 In its judgment, the Interna-
tional Court confirmed the legality of the General Assembly
resolution terminating the Mandate. According to the Interna-
tional Court:
: * *the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is
under obliqation to withdraw its administra-
tion from Namibia immediately and thus put
an end to its occupation of the Territory.5 3
United Nations authority over Namibia was held to encompass reso-
lutions binding on member states:
' States members of the United Nations
are under obligation to recognize the illegal-
ity of South Africa's presence in Namibia and
the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or
concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any
acts and in particular any dealings with the
Government of South Africa implying recogni-
tion of the legality of, or lending support
or assistance to,, such presence and administra-
tion.5
4
The opinion went beyond mere acceptance of the United Nations
resolutions, and provided a justification for the revocation.
50. S.C.Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1529th meetin 1 (1970).
51. S.C.Res. 284, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 4 (1970).
52. Namibia Opinion 32. The Namibia opinion has been
discussed in A. Obozuwa, supra note 33, at 209-28; Gordon,
"Old Orthodoxies amid New Experiences: The South West Africa
(Namibia) Litigation and the Uncertain Jurisprudence of the In-
ternational Court of Justice," I Denver J. Int'l L. & Policy
65, 79-91 (1971); Zuildwijk, "The International Court and South
West Africa: Latest Phase," 3 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 323 (1973);
"S.W. Africa Opinion of the I.C.J.: A Symposium," 1I Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 1, 193 (1972).
53. Namibia Opinion 58.
54. Id. The International Court also held that non-
members were under the same obligation.
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The International Court's argument developed a connection be-
tween obligations under the Mandate and modern conceptions of
self-determination, especially as articulated in the General
Assembly.5 5 Fundamentally, United Nations authority to termi-
nate the Mandate derives from the nearly universal consensus
in support of the right to self-determination.
5 6
The Namibia opinion dealt with the competence of spe-
cific United Nations organs to issue binding resolutions.
While recognizing that it did not possess the power of judi-
cial review regarding actions of the United Nations, the Inter-
national Court construed the Security Council's responsibility
for maintaining peace and security quite broadly.5 7 The powers
of the Council are limited only by ". . the fundamental prin-
ciples and purposes found in Chapter I of the Charter."5 8 In
the exercise of such powers, the Council can expect compliance
by members of the United Nations, even if the resolutions were
not passed in response to a threat to international peace and
security.59 The authority to bind members to a particular
course of action, however, does not reside only in the Security
Council. Although primarily entrusted with the power to pass
recommendations, the General Assembly can adopt, ". . . In spe-
cific cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions
which make determination or have operative effect.'"60 The In-
ternational Court took the position that Res. 2145 (XXI) was
within that sphere of competence.
6 1
55. Id. at 28-32; see, "Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," GA Res. 1514
(XV); 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
56. Note, "Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinion,"
545, 550-4, provided an excellent discussion of this point.
57. Namibia Opinion 57; Advisory Opinion on Certain Ex-
penses of the United Nations [1962] I.C.J. 151, 168; see Gordon,
supra note 52, at 83.
58. Namibia Opinion 52; Lissitzyn, "International Law
and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia," 11 Colum. J. Transnat'l L.
50, 63 (1972).
59. Namibia Opinion 52.
60. Namibia Opinion 50; Contra, id. 107 (dissenting op.
Fitzmaurice); see Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [19621
I.C.J. 151, 16-3. This summary of the International Court's
rulings on the competence of the United Nations organs relied
on Note, "Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions," 548-50.
61. Namibia Opinion 50.I
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B. The Council for Namibia and the Decree on Natural
Resources
After terminating the Mandate in 1966, the United Na-
tions confronted the problem of implementation. Resolution
2145 (XXI) created an Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa.
The Ad Hoc Committee was to recommend practical means administer-
ing the territory to achieve the goal of self-determination.62
At the Fifth Special Session, the General Assembly Zonsidered
the report of the Ad Hoc Committee63 and adopted Res. 2248
(s-v).64 With the exce-ption of Portugal, all states partici-
pating in the debates agreed that implementing Res. 2145 (XXI)
was the purpose of the special session.65 Resolution 2248 (s-v)
established a United Nations Council for South West Africa,
later renamed the Council for Namibia,66 to be composed of
eleven member states. 67 The General Assembly gave the Council
power:
(a) To administer South West Africa until in-
dependence, with the maximum possible partici-
pation of the people of the Territory;
(b) To promulgate such laws, decrees and ad-
ministrative regulation as are necessary for
the administration of the Territory until a
legislative assembly is established following
elections conducted on the basis of universal
adult sufferage;
(d) To take all the necessary measures for the
maintenance of law and order in the Territory;
62. G.A.Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, 96,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
63. For a summary of the Ad Hoc Committee debates and
proposals, see Review of the Proceedings, supra note 45, at
147-9. There were disagreements on the means of terminating
South African control over Namibia, but no disagreement as to
the validity of Res. 2145 (XXI). Id. 149.
64. G.A.Res. 2248 (s-v), 5th Sp. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. I,
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6657 (1967).
65. Review of the Proceedings, supra note 45, at 157.
66. G.A. Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/6716/Add.I (1968).
67. The Council now contains eighteen members. The cur-
rent members are listed in 2 "Report of the United Nations
Council for Namibia," 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/9624 (1975).
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(e) To transfer all powers to the people of
the Terrigry upon the declaration of inde-
pendence.
The resolution directed the Security Council "... to take all
appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for
[Namibia] to discharge the functions and responsibilities en-
trusted to It by the General Assembly."
69
In the 1971 Namibia opinion, the International Court did
not discuss Res. 2248 (s-v) or the status of the Council for
Namibia. Indeed, the opinion provided little guidance on the
Issue of United Nations governance of Namibia.10 Instead, the
International Court, rested Its opinion on General Assembly Res.
2145 (XXI) and Security Council Res. 276. In both of those
Resolutions, the United Nations claimed direct responsibility for
the administration of Namlbia. 71
Although the Council for Namibia had been active since
its creation in 1967,72 the 1974 Decree on the Natural Resources
of Namibia was the first legislative effort by the Council.
73
in the Decree, the Council claimed ownership over the natural
resources of Namibia. The Decree begins by forbidding any ex-
ploration, extraction, or export of Namibian resources without
the permission of the Council.7 4 The Council then declares that
any "permission, concession or licence . . . whensoever granted
by any person or entity . . . is null, void and of no force or
effect,"7 5 specifically aiming this section at the South African
Administration. The Decree apparently would void agreements
68. G.A. Res. 2248 (s-v), 5th Sp. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp.
I, at 1, pt. !1, 11,U.N. Doc. A/6657 (1967).
69. Id. pt. IV, i5.
70. Lssitzyn, supra note 58, at 71; Rovine, "The World
Court Opinion on Namibia," 11 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 203, 234-
5 (1972). For a discussion of the issues, see A. Obozuwa, supra
note 33, at 147-64. See generall E. Landis, "The Status o-
Namibia at Internation a Law," 5-6, November 1971 (paper pre-
sented at 14th Annual Meeting,African Studies Association).
71. G.A.Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, 'F 5,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1529th
meeting 1, preamble, f 6 (1970).
72. See note 23 supra.
73. The Decree was so characterized by the UN Commission-
er for Namibia. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1974, at 10, col. 4.
74. Natural Resources Decree 1I.
75. Id. I2.
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concerning natural resources concluded prior to the termina-
tion of the Mandate. The third provision of the Decree pro-
hibits the removal of any natural resource from Namibia with-
out the consent of the Council.7 6 The Decree furthermore pro-
vides that resources taken from Namibia without permission are
subject to seizure and forfeiture for the benefit of the
Council. 7 7 The Council also claims that the means of trans-
porting such natural resources are to be forfeited.7 8 The Coun-
cil would hold the forfeited goods in trust for the people of
Namibia.7 9 Finally, the Decree provides that any person or en-
tity which violates the preceding rules ". . . may be held li-
able for damages by the future Government of an independent
Namibia."80
The United Nations Council for Namibia does not have the
power directly to enforce claims to control natural
resources. The Decree suggests the possibility of enforcement
through litigation in the courts of United Nations member states.
The Council could monitor shipments of Namibian resources into
the member country and with arrival, could enter the appro-
priate court and assert that any title to the resources derived
from the South African administration was invalid, naming itself
as the rightful owner, and requesting the property be turned
over to the Council. 8 1
The remainder of this essay deals with problems in the
enforcement of the Decree in United States federal courts.
Since United States policy toward the Namibia controversy is
significant in the analysis of the issues, that policy must be
explicated.
I. United States Policy toward Namibia
The United States has frequently expressed disapproval
of South Africa's denial of the right of self-determination and






81. a-uterpacht, supra note 2, at 63-4, suggested this
course of action even before passage of the Decree.
82. Seele.g.,Davis, "Department Summarizes U.S. Policy
Toward Namibia," 73 Dept. State Bull. 36 (1975); Moynihan, U.S.
Supports U.N. Resolution on Situation in Namibia 74 Dept. State
Bull. 243 (1976); News6m, "The United Nations, the United States,
and Africa," 63 Dept. State Bull., 719, 720 (1970); White, "Self-
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alter the situation.83 United States policy has generally been
in accordance with the efforts of the United Nations. Resolu-
tion 2145 (XXI) terminating the Mandate of South Africa was
supported by the United States.84 American representatives
argued against South Afric in proceedings before the Inter-
national Court of Justice. 5 The President and Secretary of
State have explicitly stated that the United States accepted
the holding of the International Court in the 1971 Namibia
opinion.86
In accordance with the 1971 advisory opinion, a key ele-
ment of American policy is non-recognition of the South Afri-
can administration over Namibia. Commenting on that opinion,
a senior official stated:
Determination for Namibia Urged by United States," 73 Dept.
State Bull. 715-7 (1975); Yost, "'The U.S. Stake In an Effec-
tive United Nations," 62 Dept. State Bull. 705, 708 (1970).
83. For a report on several of the most recent efforts,
see Davis, supra note 82, at 38-9; Moynihan, suP note 82 at
244; "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs," 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1974)
(testimony of Ass't Sec. of State for African Affairs Easum).
84. Nabrut, "Statement in favor of Res. 2145," 55
Dept. State Bull. 870-2 (1966); see also Bennett, "U.S. Dis-
cusses Situation in Namibia," 70 Dept. State Bull. 104, 105
(1974).
85. Written Statement of the Governmentof the United
States of America, 1 Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings 843
(1970); Oral Statement of the United States, 2 Namibia Opinion,
I.C.J. Pleadings 497 (1970).
For excerpts from United States arguments relating to
South West Africa litigation before the I.C.J. preceding the
Namibla decision, see I Whiteman, Digest of international Law
715-20, 726-7, 730 (1963). The United States appeared as an
intervening party in the advisory proceedings. On interven-
tion before the I.C.J. in advisory matters, see S. Rosenne,
The International Court of Justice 245-8 (1957).
86. Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The
Emerging Structure of Peace," 66 Dept. State Bull. 311, 366
(1972); Rogers, "A Legacy of Peace: Our Responsibility to
Future Generations," 65 Dept. State Bull. 437, 439 (1971).
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This decision obliges all states to avoid
acts that would imply recognition of the
legitimacy of South Africa's administration
of the territory. The U.S. government care-
fully avoids any such action.87
The United States does not recognize any right of South Africa
to administer the territory.88 American officials have fre-
quently characterized the South African presence as an "illegal
occupation."89 in testimony before a Congressional committee,
an assistant Secretary of State asserted that the ". . . South
African Government does not have sovereignty over South-West
Africa."90 Along with the policy of non-recognition, the United
States has supported and "fully recognized" United Nations re-
sponsibility for Namibia. 9 1
A second aspect of United States policy has been to dis-
courage American investment in Namibia. The level of United
States investment in Namibia is comparatively low. Official
estimates indicate a total commitment of $45-50 million, or
less than two percent of all American investment in Africa.
9 2
Foreign investment is significant in Namibia, but other na-
tions are more deeply involved. 9 3 Since 1970 'the United States
87. Easum, "South Africa Five Years after the Lusaka
Manifesto," 71 Dept. State Bull. 838, 842 (1974).
88. Newsom, supra note 82, at 722.
89. See e.g. Davis, supra note 82, at 39; Scali, "U.S.
Deplores Continued Occupation of Namibia by South Africa," 72
Dept. State Bull. 161, 162 (1975), Scali, Statement [in U.N.
Security Council], 71 Dept. State Bull. 775 (1974); see also
Davis, "Department Discusses Situation in South Africa and
Namibia," 73 Dept. State Bull. 269-70 (1975).
90. "Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs," 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1970)
(testimony of David D. Newsom, Ass't Sec. of State for African
Affairs).
91. "United States Makes Contributions to U.N. Fund for
Namibia," 71 Dept. State Bull. 593 (1974) (source of quoted
phrase); Newsom, "Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S.
Policy," 67 Dept. State Bull. 119, 121 (1972); Newsom, supra
note 82, at 722.
92. "Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs," 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 176
(1970) (testimony of David D. Newsom); but see "Hearings on
Critical Developments in Namibia," 137-73 (United Council of
Churches, "Tsumeb - A Profile of United States Contributions to
Underdevelopment in Namibia").
93. For an extensive guide to foreign companies with
investment in Namibia, see 2 "Report of the United Nations
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government has attempted to maintain this minimum involvement,
mainly through a three point program:
1. The United States will henceforth officially
discourage investment by U.S. nationals in
Namibia.
2. Export-Import Bank credit guarantees will not
be made available for trade with Namibia.
3. U.S. nationals who invest in Namibla on the
basis of rights acquired through the South
African Government since adoption of General
Assembly Resolution 2145 (October 27, 1966)
will not receive U.S. Government assistance
in protection of such investment against
claims of a future lawful government of
Namibia.94
This program was undertaken as one means for applying pressure
to alter South African policy toward Namibia. 95 American ob-
jectives also include creating a situation in which a future
lawful government would not oppose United States investment.96
The United States also encourages American companies operating
In Namibia to conform with Universal Declaration of Human
Rights In their employment policies. 97 Furthermore, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has raised the possibility
that the securities acts could require disclosure of activi-
ties by United States corporations in Namibia which are not
in conformity with official policy.98
Council for Namibia," 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 39-75, U.N.
Doc. A/9624 (1975). The major American investors are Newmont
Mining Co. and American Metal Climax, Inc. which are major,
shareholders in Tsumeb Corporation, a Namibian mining company.
94. Yost, "The U.S. Stake In an Effective United Na-
tions," 62 Dept. State Bull. 705, 709 (1970); "Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,"
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 156-60 (1970) (testimony of David D.
Newsom). The procedures to implement the policy were described
in id. 178.
95. Yost, supra note 94, at 709.
96. Davis, supra note 82, at 37.
97. Id.
98. --earings Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs," 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 52-3 (1974);
see also id. 46-9, 52-7, 64-80.
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The United States investment policy reflects a commit-
ment to using non-coercive means to terminate South African
control over Namibia. For that reason the United States has
also opposed the use of sanctions under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter by the Security Council. 9 9 The United
States has specifically rejected the use of economic sanctions
against South Africa, which might bring about a confrontation.
The United States position was that the sanctions would require
the use of force to be effective, and that ineffective sanc-
tions would be counterproductive.1 00
Although the United States accepted United Nations re-
sponsibility for Namibia, it has not supported the Council for
Namlbia.10 1 The neutral stance toward the Council can be
traced to the desire to avoid coercive steps and a preference
for what the United States believed was practical. The United
States abstained on Res. 2248 (s-v) which established the Coun-
cil. 10 2 There was no objection to the aims of that resolution,
but the United States ". . . believed the stated function of
the Council, such as traveling to Namibia to take over the
South African Government, were beyond the U.N.'s available
means to achieve." 103 The United States has accordingly con-
strued Res. 2248 (s-v) to mean that the administrative powers
granted to the Council can be exercised only after the Council
enters Namibra. 10 4
The United States response to the Decree on the Natural
Resources reflected a limited view of the Council's powers.
In explaining why the government did not endorse the Decree,
the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs noted
that the exercise of administrative powers by the Council was
99. Seee.g., Buffum, "Department Discusses Situation in
South Africa -and Namibia," 73 Dept. State Bull. 269, 273 (1975);
Davis, supra note 82, at 37; Mazewski, "U.S. Gives Views on
Question of Namibia," 64 Dept. State Bull. 101-2 (1971), White,
supra note 82 at 716.
100. Newsom, "A Look at African Issues at the United Na-
tions," 65 Dept. State Bull. 373, 376 (1971); Yost, supra note
94, at 709.
101. See "Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs," 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Dlggs).
102. Goldberg, Statement [regarding Namibia and Res.
2248 (s-v)], 56 Dept. State Bull. 888-94 (1967).
103. Davis, supra note 82, at 38.
104. Id.
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limited by South Africa's effective control of the territory.
105
Nevertheless, that official stated:
The Department of State takes the position
that enforcement jurisdiction regarding this
decree rests not with the executive branch
but rather with the courts and parties In-
volved . . . . ]ecannot judge what position
the courts would take should the Council seek
legal recourse to enforce the decree.10
6
The State Department thus did not express a position on the
claims embodied in the Decree or even on the desirability of
judicial enforcement. 10 7 The Department indicated that if the
Decree were to be enforced the Council should direct its atten-
tion to the judicial system.
III. The Council for Namibia as a Plaintiff
In order to enforce Its Decree through judicial means,
the Council for Namibia must bring suit against parties in
possession of Namibian resources. United States courts are
not, however, open to all possible plaintiffs. This section ex-
plores two theories which could justify the Council's status as
a litigant.
A. A United Nations Agency
The Council of Namibia could enter United States courts
as a United Nations agency. The United Nations Charter pro-
vides that In each member state, the organizations should have
".. such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise
of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.1 10 8 In
accordance with the obligation under the Charter, a United
States statute permits the United Nations to sue In federal
courts:
International organizations shall, to the ex-
tent consistent with the instrument creating
them, possess the capacity
105. Id.
106. T-. 37-8.
107. The General Assembly endorsed the Decree in Res.
3295, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 106, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
The United States abstained on that resolution. However, the
United States position was not necessarily against the decree.
The United States opposed the suggestion of Chapter VII sanc-
tions in the resolution. 29 U.N. GAOR, Fourth Committee 236,
U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2078-2131 (1974); Davis, supra note 82, at
37, 38; TAN 242-4 infra.
108. U.N. Ca-rter, art. 104.
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to institute legal proceedings.l0 9
Furthermore federal courts might have jurisdiction to entertain
such suits since the United Nations Charter is a treaty to
which the United States is a party.l
1 O
Although United Nations agencies have instituted suits
as plaintiffs,11 1 the courts indicated that there were limita-
tions on the capacity. In ratifying the United Nations Charter
provision on legal capacity, the Congress evidently envisioned
suits Involving simple contract and tort claims.11 2 The courts
have interpreted the permission to sue liberally in such
cases.1 1 3 The Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States case
which involved the breach of a contract to ship milk enumerated
factors which might preclude resort to the courts.ll One of
the plaintiffs was the United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund. The court believed that this type of claim was
proper under the United Nations Charter and United States
statutes. There were no political overtones. The foreign af-
fairs of the United States could not be embarrassed by a judg-
ment. Finally, such a claim could normally be judicially
settled.l1 5 The opinion thus implied that the Court would be
less receptive to entertaining a suit which was politically
sensitive. A similar reluctance was also expressed in a re-
cent case involving the immunity of an international organiza-
tion from suit. The court in the latter case commented that
"[wihere delicate, complex issues of international economic
policy are involved, jurisdiction should be denied." 1 16 The
109. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22
U.S.C.A. §288a (a)(iii)(1964 ); See Note, "The Status of In-
ternational Organization Under The Law of the United States,"
71 Harvard L. Rev. 1300, 1301-7 (1958).
110. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1973); International Refugee Or-
gan. v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 1951)
(dicta).
11l. International Refugee Organ. v. Republic S.S.
Corp., 189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1951) (breach of contract);
Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D.
Calif. 1950) (breach of contract).
112. International Refugee Organ. v. Republic S.S.
Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 860 (4th Cir. 1951).
113. Id. 861.
114. O F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Calif. 1950).
115. Id. 833-4.
116. -utcher S.A. Celulose E Papel Candoi v. Inter-
Amer. Dev. Bank, 253 F. Supp. 568, 570 (D.C. 1966), aff'd, 382
F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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Council for Namibia could nevertheless argue that enforcement
of the Decree through the judicial process is necessary to ful-
fill the functions and purposes of the United Nations.li7
In the case of Diggs v. Shultz the Court of Appeals in
the District of Columbia considered issues raised by United Na-
tions action.1 18 The case involved sanctions against Southern
Rhodesia. In 1966 the Security Council directed members to Im-
pose a trade embargo against Southern Rhodesia. The United
States complied through an executive order, but in 1971 Con-
gress overrode the embargo. In Diggs v. Shultz the plaintiffs
sued for declaratory and injunctive relief against the importa-
tion Into the United States of materials covered by the embargo.
The court held that the Congressional action precluded enforce-
ment of the embargo even though it nullified a United States
treaty commitment under the United Nations Charter.1 19 The im-
plication was that the plaintiffs had a justiciable controversy
with the federal government. The case may thus suggest a will-
ingness to entertain international controversies, 120 although
there are features which distinguish that litigation from pos-
sible future suits by the Council. While the basis for the
suit in Diggs v. Shultz originated in the United Nations, the
plaintiffs' claim itself related to a domestic executive order.
The case was therefore not an attempt to enforce United Na-
tions legislation directly. The plaintiffs in Dlgs v. Shultz
were, moreover, not international organizations whose access
may depend on statute. It seems nevertheless that the require-
ments for standing to sue met by those plaintiffs would also be
met by the Council in a suit to enforce the Decree. 12 1 In any
event, litigation in the Council's capacity as a United Nations
117. See generally Advisory Opinion on Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949]
I.C.J. 173, 178-9.
118. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973).
119. Id. 465-6.
120. Note especially id. 465.
121. The requirements are: (1) personal interest In
order to insure an adversary presentation of the issues, (2)
that the plaintiff be in the zone of interests sought to be pro-
tected by the law in question [the court cited a Security Coun-
cil resolution to establish the zone of interest, which sug-
gests that a suit based only on United Nations resolutions
might be viable], (3) that there be a "logical nexus between
the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated."
Id. 464, see 9 Texas Int'l L.J. 114 (1974).
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agency would be unprecedented, and might be subjected to re-
sistance on the part of the courts.
B. A Government of Namibla
An alternative theory to justify access to United States
courts derives from a characterization of the Council as the
government of Namibia. The right of a foreign government to
sue In the courts depends on recognition by the United
States. 122 If a foreign state has been recognized by the
United States, it is allowed to appear in the courts as a
plaintiff,12 3 and the judicial power of the United States ex-
tends to such suits.12 4 According to the Supreme Court, comity
between nations is the basis of the privilege.12 5 Governments
which have not been recognized will be denied access to the
courts.12 6 The denial of access reflects the courts' unwill-
ingness to come into conflict with the executive branch by
Judicially "recognizing" an unrecognized government. 12 7 The
assumption is that by allowing suit by an unrecognized govern-
ment, the courts would be in conflict with American foreign
policy.
Although the rule precluding suit by a non-recognized
foreign government has been crlticized,l28 there has been no
122. For general discussion of recognition policies and
the consequences of recognition, see I. Brownlie, supra note 11,
at 89-108; M. Kaplan & N. Katzenbach, The Political Foundations
of International Law, 109-3 71961); Blix, "Contemporary Aspects
of Recognltion," 130 Recueil des Cours 587 (1971).
123. Banco Naclonal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
408-9 (1964); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126,
134, 137 (1938); The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167
(1870); P & E Shipping Corp. v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 307 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962).
124. U.S. Const. Art. III, §2.
125. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
408-9 (1964).
126. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
409 (1964); The Rogdai, 278 F. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1920); The Penza,
277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1921); Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923); Adler,
"The Unrecognized Government in the Courts of the United States,"
5 Va. J. Int'l L. 36, 39-42 (1964).
127. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
410-1 (1964).
128. The Supreme Court provided a list of critical ma-
terials at Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
411 n.12 (1964). For a later discussion which also criticizes
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contrary precedent. 12 9 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
the Supreme Court indicated that it did not have to rule on the
Issue of an unrecognized government as plaintiff. The Court
merely raised the Issue of access. 130 An intermediate level
New York court permitted a suit based on a claim assigned to
the plaintiff (a United States citizen) by the unrecognized
East German government in Upright v. Mercury Business Ma-
chines. 1 31 Although the opinion indicated a willingness to
depart from a rigid analysis of the effects of non-recognition
in terms of personal rights, the court explicitly retained the
rule that the plaintiff cannot be an unrecognized government.
132
The Upright result, which permits an assignee to stand in the
place of a government, was no more artificial than the tor.
Trading Corporation v. United States case.133 The plaintiff
in Amtorg was a New York corporation, wholly owned by the un-
recognized Russian government, which would have been barred
from suing.13 4 Finally, lawyers for the unrecognized People's
the doctrine, see Adler, supra note 126 at 40-2; 12 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 155 (1973). The response has not been entirely
critical. Restatement (second) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States §107, comment e at 339 thereinafter cited as
Restatement], does not require a state to grant access to an
unrecognized government.
129. In the unreported case of United States of Mexico
v. Viamonte y Fernandez (Sup. Ct., Essex Co., Mass. 1923), the
plaintiff was the unrecognized government of Mexico. The De-
partment of State indicated to the court that the United States
recognized the state of Mexico. H. Briggs, The Law of Nations
154-6 (1952). The distinction between recognition of a state
and of a government is of doubtful significance.
130. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
411 n.12 (1964).
131. 13 App. Div. 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dept.19 61),
reversing, 26 Misc.2d 1069, 207 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (no
appeal taken). The case was discussed In Lubman, "The Unrecog-
nized Government in American Courts: Upright v. Mercury Business
Machines," 62 Colum. L. Rev. 275, 280, 294-7 (1962).
132. Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 13 App. Div.
36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dept. 1961), reversing, 26 Misc.2d
1069, 207 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
133. 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
134. Id. 529. The Upright and Amtorq cases seem to be
absurd invitations to evasion of the rule against suits by an
unrecognized government. The Council of Namibia presumably
could utilize the Upright rule by selling its claim to natural
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Republic of China were allowed to intervene in Bank of China v.
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust co. 135 The issue in that case
was ownership of funds deposited by the Bank of China before
the domination of the mainland by the People's Republic. There
were two successors to the Bank that claimed the funds. While
the court eventually awarded the deposits to the Nationalist
claimants, since that government was recognized by the United
States, the non-recognition of the People's Republic did not
preclude the intervention.13 6 However, the plaintiff In the
case was not the unrecognized government. Even the limited
access afforded by the Bank of China case was denied to an
East German museum recently in a New York federal court. 13 7
The decisions to recognize particular governments and
the formulation of guiding policies are entirely a matter for
resources to a third party for value. On the other hand, the
Council could establish an intermediary Incorporated in the
U.S. as in Amtorg. If these alternatives proved to be effec-
tive, the Council would be able to partially achieve Its ob-
jectives. However, the courts probably would not be receptive
to fake transactions designed only to circumvent the rule.
Indeed, the Upright court explicitly indicated that the plain-
tiff was a bona fide purchaser for value. Furthermore, the
court in Amtorg suggested that the result might be limited to
the unique statutory proceedings. 71 F.2d at 528. Intermedi-
aries have been used to gain access to tribunals in Interna-
tional practice. Since participation in many arenas of inter-
national decision is limited to states, individuals and groups
have presented claims through states. The substitution of a
third party for a party in Interest to overcome rules limiting
access has been described as the principle of mutable privity.
W. Reisman, Nullity and Revision 90-1, 351 (1971). An attempt
by the Council to utilize Upright or Amtorg would present the
reverse of the usual application of the principle - a state's
claim would be pressed before a tribunal by a non-state entity.
Probably the greatest barrier to extension of the Upright
or Amtorg cases to the Namibia litigation is the fact that the
prior cases touched lightly on issues of American foreign pol-
icy. The potential for conflict with the Executive Branch is
significant, and probably would inhibit the courts. See 7
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 213, 217-8 (1973).
135. 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal. 1952), modified, 209
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953). For earlier opinions in the case,
see 92 F.Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950), appeal dismissed, 190
F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1951).
136. 104 F.Supp. at 66.
137. Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F.
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the executive branch.13 8 United States courts accept recogni-
tion decisions by the executive branch as conclusive.139 Al-
though no particular modes of recognition are prescribed, the
intention to recognize must be clear.140 Recognition may be
express or implied, but recognition can be implied only from
acts which unequivocally indicate the necessary intent. 1 I
A review of United States policy toward the Council for
Namibia does not reveal an intent to recognize the Council as
the government of Namibia. The United States abstained from
the resolution creating the Council, and has taken the position
that the administrative powers granted to the Council can be
exercised only after it gains access to the 'territory. American
investment policy has included references to a future lawful
government of Namibia, even though the Council has concurrently
existed. In accepting the Namibia opinion and United Nations
responsibility for the territory, the United States did not
necessarily recognize the international organization as a gov-
ernment.1 4  Consequently, the rule precluding suit by an un-
Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1970, 1972), affd per curiam 478 F.2d 231
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U-.S. 931 (9 The district
court reaffirmed the rule against suits by unrecognized govern-
ments in light of the Sabbatino opinion. 12 Colum. J. Transnat'l
L. 155 (1973). The Elicofon decision may indicate a retreat from
the Upright approach, since the denial of the East German cor-
poration s motion to intervene was based on the link to the un-
recognized government without further analysis of whether only
personal rights were involved or whether the policy of non-
recognition would be defeated by allowing the lawsuit to con-
tinue. 7 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 213, 217-8, 222-3 (1973).
138. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942);
National Union Fire ins. Co. v. Republic of China, 254 F.2d 177,
186 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958); Latvian
State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000,
1002-3 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 816 (1951); The
Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 440 (3d Cir. 19414).
139. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126,
137 (1938).
140. 2 Whiteman, Digest of international Law 48-68 (1963);
see Restatement 6104.
141. 2 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 48 (1963);
Restatement §104, comments b, c, Illustration 3, 4; see Restate-
ment §9105-6.
142. TAN 101-4 supra. The issuance of travel documents
to exiled Namibians by the United States does not constitute
recognition. Restatement §104, comment c. Indeed, the issuance
of such documents at the same time that the Council issues travel
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recognized government would apply to the Council for Namibia.
That is, characterization of the Council as a government 143
will not provide access to the courts unless United States
policy changes.1
4 4
IV. Act of State
In a suit instituted by the Council of Namibia against
parties in possession of Namibian resources, the validity of
the defendant's title to the resources would be a central
issue. To establish a valid title, the defendant probably
would rely on rights derived from the South African administra-
tion. The basis of the right to possession might include
licenses, concessions, or other agreements.14 5" Reliance on
rights ultimately acquired from the South African administra-
tion could-onstitute a complete defense provided that the Amer-
ican act of state doctrine applies.
The act of state doctrine precludes United States courts
from examining the validity of the acts of a foreign government
in certain circumstances. 146 The contours of the act of state
rule were discussed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.1 7
documents is a further indication of non-recognition. Further-
more, United States contributions to the United Nations Fund
for Namibia have not been construed by the State Department as
an act of recognition. See Davis, supra note 82, at 38.
143. Since the issue is access to United States courts,
it is not necessary to determine whether the Council has been
(or could be) construed as a government by the United Nations
or other member states. On the problem of whether the United
Nations could assume the role of a government, see 1. Brownlie,
supra note 11, at 175-9, 664-6.
144. For alternatives to current United States policy,
see TAN 275-86 infra.
145. See "Report of the United Nations Council for Nami-
bia," 28 U.N.-GAOR Supp. 24 at 14-27, U.N. Doc. A/9024 (1974);
L. Lazar, supra note 6, at 18-20, 74-97. The Report and Lazar's
book provide an overview of the Namibian economy, and indicate
the importance of the South African administration in creating
the framework for foreign investment.
146. An introductory discussion can be found in Annot.,
12 A.L.R. Fed. 707 (1972). Early statements of the doctrine
were Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American
Metal Company, Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
147. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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The case involved the nationalization of a cargo of sugar by
the Cuban government within that country. Cuba did not provide
compensation to the American owners of the sugar. The former
owners brought suit to claim the proceeds from the sale of
the sugar In the United States. The Supreme Court declined to
rule on the nationalization laws:
• . . we decide only that the Judicial Branch
will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a for-
eign sovereign government, extant and recog-
nized by this country at the time of suit,
in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal princi-
ples, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.
14 8
Although the doctrine prohibited the Court from ruling on the
legality of the foreign act of state, the Court did not dis-
miss the case. 149 On the contrary, the Court decided the
case on the merits after attributing an irrebutable presumption
of legality to the foreign act.]5 0
Application of the act of state doctrine has not been
limited to controversies involving expropriation as In the
Sabbatino case.15 1 Acts of state can include any public or
governmental act even though most of the cases had to do with
confiscations.152 A concession agreement between an investor
148. Id. 428.
149. Thus, the act of state doctrine cannot be ex-
plained in terms of "political questions", since dismissal
would then be the proper disposition. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962). Contra, First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787-8 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
150. 376 U.S. at 439. Cf. id. 470-2 (White, J., dis-
senting).
151. Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco Mara-
caibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1299 (Del. 1970). Cf. 16
Harv. Int'l L.J. 456, 466 (1975) (suggest that the Sa-bbatino
formulation is limited to expropriations). The formulation
of the act of state doctrine in the Restatement §41 was not
limited to expropriations.
152. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Jimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962); stay denied, 314
F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Jimenez v. Hixon, 373
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and a foreign government covering mining rights within the
country would be an act of state. 15 3 Courts have decided that
various other types of economic regulation constitute acts of
state.154
The act of state doctrine has been the subject of ex-
tensive criticism. 155 Both within the courts and among the
commentators disagreement has persisted concerning the theoreti-
cal justifications and proper scope of the doctrine.15 6 The
Sabbatino formulation of the rule diminishes the role of the
judicial branch in the conduct of foreign affairs and elimi-
nates the contribution of national courts to the development
of international law. By immunizing possible violations of
international law, the opinion can encourage disorder and
deny relief to harmed parties.157 Nevertheless, the act of
U.S. 914 (1963); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114
F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1940); Restatement §41, comment d.
153. Interamerican Refinery Corporation v. Texaco Mara-
caibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (Del. 1970).
154. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242
N.E.2d 704 (1968); Wells Fargo & Co., Express S.A. v. Tribolet,
46 Ariz. 311, 50 P.2d 878 (1935); see Menendez v. Faber, Coe &
Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified sub
nom. Menendez v. Saks and Company, 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. granted sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Re-
public of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905
(1971).
United States courts will not, however, enforce foreign
penal or revenue laws. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 413-4 (1964). This rule is consistent with the
act of state doctrine in that the courts do not inquire into
the validity of such laws. Restatement §41, comment 1.
155. A bibliography would not be useful in this essay.
The quantity of the literature was noted in Lowenfeld, "Act of
State and Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba," 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 795, 798-9 (1972).
156. For disagreement among judges, see First National
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
157. McDougal, "Act of State in Policy Perspective:
The International Law of an International Economy," in Private
Investors Abroad - Structures and Safeguards 327, 337-42
(V. Cameron ed. 1966).
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state doctrine remains part of American jurisprudence. 158 Con-
gress and the courts have developed certain "exceptions" to the
doctrine.15 9 Several of the qualifications to the doctrine are
relevant to the possible litigation by the Council for
Namibia.160
If the act of state doctrine does not apply In a particu-
lar situation, the party contesting the act will not necessar-
ily prevail. In the absence of the doctrine, the courts need
not abstain from a ruling on the merits of the foreign act.
The court would rely in formulating its decision on applicable
conflict of laws rules and the appropriate deference to acts of
another state.161 Thus, even if the Council for Namibia per-
158. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). In this case only Justice Powell ex-
pressed doubt as to the wisdom of Sabbatino. The act of state
doctrine remained in the Restatement §4i. However, the Supreme
Court requested argument on whether Sabbatino should be recon-
sidered in the Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba case. 15 int'l Legal Materials 155 (1976). The briefs
on that point are summarized ibid. 155-68.
159. See 49 Wash. L. Rev.-213, 223 (1973).
160. Two'exceptions are not relevant to a suit by the
Council for Namibia. In response to the Sabbatino decision,
Congress created an exception to the doctrine in cases Involv-
ing a taking or confiscation contrary to international law.
The enactment was known as the Hickenlooper Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. §2370(e)(2). The Hicken-
looper Amendment was held constitutional. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 95 -968).
The text and the legislative history indicate that the amend-
ment was not intended to cover situations such as presented by
the Council. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City
Bank, 431 F.2d 3-9h, 399-402 (2d Cir. 1970). The other excep-
tion covers situations in which there is a treaty or agreement
which clearly specifies controlling rules of law. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 1128 (1964). The
only treaty which could apply in the Council litigation is the
U.N. Charter. It is doubtful that a court would find the
Charter sufficiently unambiguous, or of the type of treaty en-
visioned by Sabbatino.
161. See H. Steiner & D. Vagts., Transnational Legal.
Problems 585-T9-196B).
[VOL. 2
DECREE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
suades a court to disregard the act of state doctrine, it
must still demonstrate the illegality of the South African
acts.
A. Executive Authorization
One of the justifications for the act of state doctrine
is the belief that judicial inquiry into such acts could em-
barrass the executive branch in the conduct of foreign pol-
icy.1 62 In situations where the executive branch expressed no
objection, the courts have proceeded to a ruling on the merits
of the foreign law.163 This limitation on the act of state
doctrine originated in the Bernstein litigation.1 6 4 The liti-
gation involved property which had been forcibly taken from
Bernstein by the Nazi Government while he was a German citi-
zen in Germany. After leaving Germany, Bernstein sued the
subsequent purchaser who had notice of the taking for the
value of his property. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
twice refused to rule on the validity of the Nazi seizures
due to the act of state doctrine. 165 The court indicated
that it would hear the case on the merits if the executive
branch indicated no objection.16 6 The State Department then
issued a press release, which stated that the executive pol-
icy was to remove any restraint from inquiry into the legal-
ity of Nazi seizures of identifiable property.167 In response
to the expression of executive policy, the court ordered a
trial on the merits of Bernstein's claim.
16 8
The current status of the Bernstein exception is some-
162. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 427-8, 431-3 (1964); First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762-8 (1972).
163. Restatement §41, comment h.
164. Summarized in H. Steiner & D. Vagts, supra note
161, at 606-10.
165. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d
246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947);
Bernstein v. N.V., Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart
Maatschapplj, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
166. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d
246, 252 (2d Cir. 1947).
167. State Department Press Release No. 296 (April 27,
1949), quoted in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerl-
kaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir.
1954).
168. Id. Bernstein eventually settled his claim.
H. Steiner & D. Vagts, supra note 161, at 610.
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what unclear. Few courts have followed Bernstein or even cited
the cases.1 69 The Supreme Court did not have cause to rule on
the Bernstein cases in Sabbatino, since the Court held that the
executive branch favored abstention in that case. 17 0 The
Sabbatino Court did state that a reverse Bernstein rule In which
the act of state doctrine would not apply unless the State De-
partment requested abstention would be "unwarranted." 171 That
opinion also noted that the Nazi regime was not in existence at
the time of the Bernstein litigation.172 The Justices discussed
the exception in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba. 173 The case grew out of the Cuban expropriation without
compensation of the American bank's property in Cuba. The Cuban
national bank instituted suit for excess collateral held by the
American bank to secure a loan. The latter bank filed a coun-
terclaim for the excess funds on the theory that the expro-
priation was illegal and that it deserved compensation. A
majority on the Supreme Court permitted the counterclaim, but
three different justifications were presented. Justice Rehn-
quist relied on a letter from the State Department which took
the position that the act of state doctrine should not apply
to bar a counterclaim limited to the claim of the Cuban agen-
cy.17 4 Since there was no possibility of disrupting the con-
169. The subsequent use of the Bernstein cases was dis-
cussed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank,
442 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1971); Andrews, "Act of State --
Executive Determination," 35 Zeitschift fur auslandisches
offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 41, 113-5 (1975).
170. 376 U.S. at 419-20.
171. Id. 436 (the Court's reference to Bernstein clear-
ly indicated th-at the exception was not "deemed valid" in
Sabbatino).
172. Id. 428.
173. 4iO6 U.S. 759 (1972). For commentary, see Andrews,
supra note 169, at 45-9; Leigh, "The Supreme Court and the
Sabbatino Watchers: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba," 13 Va. J. Int'l L. 33 (1972); Lowenfeld, supra note
155, passim; 3 Denver J. Int'l L. & Policy 117 (1973TFTT
Harvard Int'l L.J. 131 (1973); Note, "Executive Suggestion and
Act of State Cases: Implications of the Stevenson Letter in
the Citibank Case," 12 Harv. Int' L.J. 557 (1971); 49 Wash. L.
Rev. 213 (1973).
174. The letter was reprinted in the lower court opin-
ion. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 442
F.2d 530, 536-8 (2d Cir. 1971).
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duct of foreign affairs by the Executive, the basis of the
doctrine was removed. Justice Rehnquist expressly approved
the Bernstein exception. 17 5 Justice Douglas believed that
the counterclaim was not subject to the act of state doctrine
in any event.17 6 In the opinion of Justice Powell, the
Sabbatino case was wrongly decided and the courts had an obli-
gation to hear such cases. 17 7 According to Justice Douglas the
Bernstein rule did not apply to the case. While Justice Powell
did not explicitly reject the Bernstein exception, he clearly
disapproved of such deference to the Executive. In the dis-
sent, Justice Brennan rejected the exception.17 8 Thus, only
three Justices endorsed Bernstein, and six Justices expressed
a hostile attitude to that case.
Although the First National City opinions did little to
clarify the act of state doctrine or meet the objections of the
critics,1 79 ,he case suggested an active role for the State
Department. 0 The State Department has never rejected the
Bernstein exception,181 and will intervene in appropriate cir-
cumstances.182 In a suit to enforce the Natural Resources
Decree, the Council for Namibia could request a Bernstein
letter if the act of state issue arises. The State Depart-
ment response would be made after an evaluation of the issues
175. 406 U.S. at 768.
176. Id. 770-3. Douglas argued that when a foreign
sovereign enters United States courts as a plaintiff, it be-
comes subject to fair counterclaims of the defendant. His
opinion relied on National City Bank v. Republic of China,
348 U.S. 356 (1955).
177. 406 U.S. at 774-6.
178. Id. 776-7, 785-93.
179. 3-Denver J. Int'l L. & Policy 117, 119-26 (1973);
14 Harvard Int'l L.J. 131, 141-4 (1973); 49 Wash. L. Rev. 213,
215 (1973).
180. Lowenfeld, supra note 155, at 803.
181. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City
Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 536-8 (2d Cir. 1971) (letter from the
State Department Legal Advisor); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at Appendix, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, cert. granted 416 U.S. 981 (1974) (let-
ter from State Department Legal Advisor), 15 Int'l Legal
Materials 164-6 (1976).
182. See Rovine, "Contemporary Practice of the U.S.
Relating to International Law," 68 Am. J. Int'l L. 309, 309-11
(1974) (excerpt from letter by State Department Acting Legal
Advisor).
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raised by the Council in Ahe context of previous applications of
the Bernstein exception. l 3
State Department policy in act of state cases provides
a basis for a Bernstein letter in the Council for Namibia liti-
gation. In addition to the Berstein and First National City_
letters, the Department has twice declined to insist on act of
state protection for nationalization decrees in suits by former
owners of property. In certain situations, an act of Congress
directs courts to adjudicate cases involving foreign national-
ization unless the Department directs otherwise. In the
first exercise of that power, the State Department permitted
a judgment on the merits in the Sabbatino case after remand to
the district court.185 The Department has issued a policy
statement on the recent Libyan confiscation of American oil in-
terests in which it indicated no opposition to suits to re-
claim the nationalized oil.l 8 6 A conmon theme in the Depart-
ment's response has been opposition to acts which were deemed
to be violations of international law.187 Indeed, the State
Department Legal Advisor recently noted that the trend in ex-
ecutive decisions has been to allow adjudication of alleged
violation of international law.18 8 The Legal Advisor further-
183. For a discussion of various approaches to the
decision, see Lowenfeld, supra note 155, at 806-14.
184. The Department statement is not exactly comparable
to the letters in the earlier cases, since the Hickenlooper
Amendment applies. 'See note 160 supra. The Hickenlooper
Amendment essentially created a reverse Bernstein exception--
the act of state doctrine does not apply unless the Department
requires the application of the rule. The Department has ex-
pressed no policy on different treatment for the two situations.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 155, at 804-5.
185. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F.Supp. 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 956'1968).
186. Statement by the Department of State on its policy
concerning "Hot" Libyan Oil, 13 Int'l Legal Materials 767 (1974)
(transmitted to Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 8, 1974).
187. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954);
Libyan Hot Oil Statement, supra note 186, at 771, 774, 776, 779.
188. United States Amicus Brief (Dunhill), supra note
181, at 165 (1976).
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more expressed no hostility to adjudication of all claims based
on violations of international law:
In general this Department's experience
provides little support for a presumption that
adjudication of acts of foreign states in ac-
cordance with relevant principles of inter-
national law would embarrass the conduct of
foreign policy. Thus, it is our view that if
the Court should decide to overrule the hold-
ing in Sabbatino so that acts of state would
thereafter be subject to adjudication in Amer-
ican courts under international law, we would
not anticipate embarrassment to the conduct
of the foreign policy of the United States.189
In the Libyan oil controversy, the refusal to insist on appli-
cation of the act of state doctrine was expressly an attempt
to discourage illegal foreign acts.'9 0 The fundamental object
of a suit by the Council is the termination of an illegal situ-
ation. According to the United Nations and the International
Court, South Africa's administration of Namibia is in violation
of international law. 19 1 In the First National City letter,
the Department called attention to the fact that any waiver
of the doctrine must not damage United States foreign policy
interests.1 9 2 The United States has accepted the Namibia opin-
ion, and does not recognize the right of South Africa to ad-
minister Namibia. Investors have been on notice that rights
acquired from South.Africa after 1966 will not receive pro-
tection from the United States. Indeed, the State Department
discourages American investment in Namibia. Expressions of
United States policy toward Namibia would not pose an insur-
mountable barrier to State Department intervention. 19 3 The
objects of the Cuban and Libyan nationalizations were United
States corporations. By contrast, Bernstein was not even a
resident of the United States at the time his property was
taken, although he later resided in the country. United States
189. Id. 166. It is worth noting that this is a re-
versal of the position taken by the Department in the Sabbatino
case. 376 U.S. at 419-20.
190. Libyan Hot Oil Statement, supra note 186, at 781-2.
191. TAN 44-61 supra. On the illegality of the spe-
cific South African acts at issue, see TAN 231-68 infra.
192. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank,
442 F.2d 530, 536-8 (2d Cir. 1971).
193. TAN 84-100 supra.
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opposition to Germany in World War II, as well as the fact that
at the time of the Bernstein litigation the Nazi regime was no
longer in existence are other possibly relevant details. In the
case of Cuba and Libya, on the other hand, the very same govern-
ments whose actions gave rise to the issue of the act of state
were in power at the time of litigation. All four situations
involved forceable and discriminatory confiscations of proper-
ty. In this respect the Namibian situation is different. Never-
theless the State Department has not adopted a restrictive view
of the exception. In the First National City letter, the De-
partment took the position that the exception was not limited
to the particular facts of the Bernstein case.19 4 Almost cer-
tainly, the First National City letter was not Intended to
limit the exception to a particular type of counterclaim.19 5
The formulation of State Department policy on litigation
to enforce the Council of Namibia's Decree will require a
broader contextual analysis than is possible in this essay. If
past decisions are any indication, the Department's decision
will rest in part on the international law issues raised by
the Council and the objectives of United States policy.19 6 The
case for State Department intervention is strong due to the in-
ternational consensus in opposition to South African administra-
tion of Namibia. 197 The State Department's early response to
the Natural Resources Decree suggested a willingness to allow
the courts to rule on the merits of the claims arising in con-
nection with concessions granted after the termination of the
mandate. 198
B. Extraterritoriality
The act of state doctrine does not preclude judicial de-
cisions concerning the validity of acts intended to affect
property outside a state's territory. This limitation on the
doctrine was part of the Sabbatino holding, 19 9 and has been
194. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank,
442 F.2d 530, 536-8 (2d Cir. 1971).
195. Lowenfeld, supra note 155, at 806-7. For alterna-
tive discussion of the precedents, see Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. First National City Bank, 442 F.2d.530, 534-5 (2d Cir. 1971);
49 Wash. L. Rev. 213, 216-9 (1973). Justice Brennan would re-
strict the Bernstein exception to the facts of that case.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 788 n.12 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
196. Contra, Lowenfeld, supra note 155, at 810-4.
197. TAN 22, 55-6 supra.
198. TAN 106.
199. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
428 (1964).
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followed in numerous cases. 2 00 In Republic of Iraq v. First
National City Bank, the revolutionary government of Iraq at-
tempted to claim property owned by the deposed King. 2 0 1 The
government had issued decrees confiscating all of the former
King's property. At the time of the decrees, the King held
cash and stock in an American bank. Since the property was not
in Iraq, the act of state doctrine did not apply. The court
thus could examine the legality and enforceability of the de-
crees in light of United States laws and policy. The Iraqi
government did not prevail. 2 02 Hungarian confiscation decrees
which purportedly reached property in the United States were
not immune from judicial review in Zwack v. Kraus Bros. &
Co.2 0 3 In a series of cases, courts ruled on the validity of
nationalization decrees by Soviet governments of Estonia and
Latvia as they affected ships outside the territory of the two
states.20 4 Courts have also examined acts which took place
200. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 707, 765-75 (1972).
201. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1027 (1966).
202. Id. 51. The State Department noted that a Bern-
stein letter was not necessary because of the extraterritorial
reach of the decrees. Id. 51 n.5.
203. 237 F.2d 25-5 (2d Cir. 1956). Other cases in which
a foreign law attempts to reach property In the United States
are summarized in 6 Whiteman, Digest of International Law
54-66 (1968). See e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 899 (S:D.N.Y. 1968), mod. on
other grounds, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denie'd,03
U.S. 905 (1971); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256
F. Supp. 481, 487-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 830 (1967); see also Oliva v.
Pan-American Life Insurance Company, 448 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir.
1971) (contract); Pan-American Life Insurance Company v. Blanco,
362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966) (contract).
204. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v.
McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 816 (1951); The Maret, 145 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1944);
Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United States,
116 F. Supp. 717, 126 Ct. Cl. 802 (1953); Estonian State Cargo
& Passenger S.S. Line v. United States 116 F. Supp. 447, 126
Ct. Cl. 809 (1953); see A/S Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank,
189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1947); but
see The Denney, 127 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1942).
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outside of the state's territory.20 5 The interests allegedly
affected by a foreign law need not be within the United States
in order to overcome the act of state doctrine. If the proper-
ty was In a third state at the time of the act, American courts
need not apply the doctrine.20
6
The extraterritoriality exception to the act of state
doctrine could apply to enforcement litigation by the Council
for Namibia. Parties in possession of natural resources held
in violation of the Council's Decree would rely on acts of the
South African administration affecting interests in Namibia to
establish their rights to the property.2 0 7 That argument as-
sumes that Namibia is part of South Africa's territory. If
Namibia were an undisputed colony or Mandate Territory, the ex-
traterritoriality exception would not apply.208 However, the
status of Namibia is at issue. According to resolutions of
the United Nations and the International Court of Justice advisory
opinion, South Africa's presence is illegal. South Africa has
no right to the territory or to its administration. In es-
sence, Namibia is not South African territory. 20 9 The United
States has adopted the same position.2 1 0 The South African
205. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 254, 363 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied 381 U.S. 934 (1964); Menzel v. List, 49 Misc.2d
300, 311, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966), aff'd,
28 App. Dlv. 2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dept. 1967); Restate-
ment §43, comment c.
206. Restatement §43, comment b.
207. See Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (Del. 1970); cf. Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp-.892, 900-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Naamloze Vennootschap Suikenfabriek "Wono-
Aseh" v. Chase Nat. Bank, 111 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
208. Naamloze Vennootschap Suikenfabriek "Wono-Aseh" v.
Chase Nat. Bank, IIl F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Colonial
government); The Janko (The Norsktank), 54 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.N.Y.
1944) (colonial government). Research indicated no cases deal-
ing with the acts of a mandatory power. It would be unreason-
able to treat Mandatory or Trusteeship powers less favorably
than colonial powers in this respect.
209. TAN 44-56. The principle of non-annexation was
part of the Mandate system. See TAN 28.
210. TAN 82-91.
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presence in Namibia has been described by American officials
as an "Illegal occupation."2 1 1 A court which accepted the
United Nations, International Court, and United States posi-
tion would not be constrained by the act of state doctrine In
the context of events arising after the termination of the
mandate. The problem with this line of analysis Is that the
extraterritoriality cases have generally involved acts which
attempted to reach property in territory over which the acting
state had no control. 2'2 While the presence of de facto control
distinguishes the Namibia situation, It does not resolve the
issue against the Council. United States courts have frequently
reviewed the validity of acts committed by a state while In il-
legal occupation of territory.2 13 De facto control is thus not
sufficient to overcome the extraterritoriality exception.
The application of the extraterritoriality exception to
the Namibian controversy illustrates the decisive Importance of
international law issues. A court could not rule on the appli-
cation of the act of state doctrine without a prior determina-
tion of the status of Namibia.2 14 Litigation by the Council for
Namibia would be one case in which the court would inevitably
review acts of South Africa.
C. Recognition
The Sabbatino holding acknowledged a third limitation on
the act of state doctrine. The Court required the acting state
to be "extant and recognized" by the United States. 2 15 The
211. TAN 89-90.
212. An exception is Menzel v. List, 49 Misc.2d 300,
311, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966) (Nazi occupa-
tion of Belgium).
213. The Supreme Court reviewed acts of the Confederacy
and the Confederate state government in a series of cases after
the Civil War. See e.g. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,
733 (1868); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877). See TAN
256-60 infra. For other cases and commentary, see 6 Whiteman,
Digest of International Law 76-88 (1968).
214. Justice White made a similar observation In his
dissent in Sabbatino. He noted that the Court had to rely on
international law in its finding that the expropriated sugar
was within Cuba. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 454-5 (1964).
215. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
428 (1964). Restatement §42. See Adler, supra note 129, at
42-51.
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courts have applied this exception in situations where the
acting state was not recognized at the time of trial or at the
time of the act in question.2 16 The Supreme Court reviewed
enactments of the Confederacy and the Confederate state govern-
ments In a series of cases after the Civil War.2 17 The Con-
federate regime was obviously not recognized by the United
States. Failure to recognize the incorporation of Estonia and
Latvia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a fac-
tor in allowing courts to inquire into the validity of nation-
alization decrees,21o Russian laws were examined In American
courts prior to recognition.2 19 The fact that courts have en-
forced the acts of unrecognized governments in some cases does
not contravene the rule. Even in such cases, the courts ex-
amine the foreign acts in accordance with normal conflict of
law rules. 22 0 The decision to apply the act of state doc-
trine must be distinguished from a decision on the merits of
a foreign act.
2 2 1
Application of the unrecognized regime exception to
the act of state doctrine in a suit instituted by the Council
for Namibia raises a significant issue. The problem in-
volves determining the-effect of the American non-recognition
policy toward the South African administration. The United
States does not recognize South Africa as the legitimate gov-
ernment of Namibia.2 2 The statements of American policy
216. If recognition takes place between the time of the
act and the time of the trial, the doctrine would apply. See
e.g. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Restatement
§42 (b).
217. See e.g. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1878);
Texas v. White-7'-U'.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868); Lubman, supra
note 131, at 292-3; cf.'The Nueva Anna, I9 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 193
(1821) (involving the-unrecognized Mexican government).
218. Cases cited note 204 supra. The cases can also
be explained by the extraterritoriality exception.
219. See e.g. Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. National City
Bank, 253 N.Y.23-F930); James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins.
Co., 239 N.Y. 248 (1925); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239
N.Y. 158 (1924).
220. See The Denny, 127 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1942); Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,
900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,
262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
221. Restatement §42, comment d, §113, comments ab.
222. TAN 87-91.
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toward Namibia are similar to prior expressions of non-
recognition that have guided courts, 22 3 but the Namibia situ-
ation is unique because it apparently involves the withdrawal
of recognition.224 Although there is some authority for the
proposition that recognition cannot be withdrawn,225 the State
Department Acting Legal Advisor recently testified that with-
drawal was possible through official statements or other
modes.226 Because the withdrawal of recognition (as opposed
to breaking diplomatic relations) has been quite rare, there is
an absence of precedent concerning the effect of such a pol-
icy.2 2 7 Since recognition policy fundamentally reflects the
executive branch's asse sment of the foreign policy interests
of the United States,2 2A the resolution of this issue depends
223. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v.
McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1951); The Maret, 145
F.2d 431, 438 (3d Cir. 1944).
224. Presumably the United States recognized the South
African authority under the Mandate. Another unique aspect
is the fact that the withdrawal does not apply to South Africa,
but only to the administration of Namibia.
225. 2 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 27 (1963);
Restatement §96, reporter's note 1.
2267 "Hearings on S. Res. 205 Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations," 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 13-5 (1969) (testi-
mony of George H. Aldrich) [hereinafter cited as "Hearings on
S. Res. 205"]; Restatement §96.
227. Only two comparable examples of non-recognition
were discovered. In 1915 the United States refused to recog-
nize an agreement between China and Japan which might have
impaired United States China policy. Telegram from the Secre-
tary of State to Ambassador in Japan, [1915] 15 Foreign Rel.
U.S. 146 (1924). The United States also refused to recognize
the Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931. 6 Dept. State
Press Releases 41-2 (1932). These examples were discussed in
"Hearings on S. Res. 205" 44 (statement of Dr. Stephen Pan).
See generally H. Briggs, supra note 129, at 132; Blix, supra
note 122, at 656-65.
228. "Hearings on S. Res. 205" 8-12 (testimony of
George H. Aldrich). The Restatement takes the position that
withdrawal of recognition can take place only if a state no
longer meets certain minimum requirements for recognition.
The requirements include a defined territory and population,
effective control, and the capacity to engage in foreign re-
lations. Restatement §96(1), §100. Withdrawal is invalid if
no successor government is recognized. Id. §96 (2)(a), il-
lustration 4. Furthermore, premature recognition is a viola-
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on whether the executive is willing to accept the consequences
which normally flow from non-recognition. A reasonable in-
terpretation of American policy would characterize the South
African administration of Namibia as an unrecognized regime.
22 9
United States courts could thus review acts of the South Afri-
can administration, at least from the date the United Nations
terminated the Mandate.2 30
V. The Status of South African Administrative Acts
The previous sections dealt with two obstacles to a judg-
ment on the merits in litigation to enforce the Council of
Namibia's Decree on Natural Resources.2 31 Assuming the Council
gains access to a court and evades the act of state doctrine,
the title to Namibian resources imported into the United States
remains at issue. The court must decide whether concessions,
licenses, or similar types of economic agreements granted by
the South African administration should be enforced in the
United States. In rendering its decision, the court would draw
tion of international law. Id. §99 (2). Although these rules
are overly formal, there is support in United States recogni-
tion practice. 2 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 68-119
(1963).
229. United States presentation before the Internation-
al Court in the Namibia case indicated a willingness to treat
the South African administration as an unrecognized regime.
Written Statement of the Government of the United States of
America, I Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings 883 (1970); Oral
Statement of the United States, 2 Namibia Opinion, I.C.J.
Pleadings 502-3 (1970). See TAN 87-8 supra.
230. In two cases, courts permitted review where the
acting state was recognized at the time of the act, but not
at the time of the trial. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954); Henzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966). These cases suggest that entitle-
ments dating from before 1966 might be open to challenge. How-
ever, the result in Bernstein was entirely due to the State
Department letter. In both cases the Nazi regime was no
longer in existence. Extension of the exception to the re-
verse of the rule stated in note 216 supra seems unlikely.
231. That is, a judgment based on a determination of
the legality of rights derived from South Africa.
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upon all relevant sources of law,2 32 recognizing international
law as part of United States law.2 33
According to the International Court of Justice, states
have an obligation to bring about an end to the illegal South
African administration of Namibia.234 The political organs of
the United Nations determine the specific consequences of the
obligation.2 3 5 The International Court confined its dis-
cussion of the duty of non-recognition to the implications
of Security Council Res. 276 (1970).236 The International
Court ruled that states must refrain from treaties in which
South Africa acts on behalf of Namibia. Diplomatic and con-
sular relations must be reordered so as to avoid recognition
of South African control. The obligation to avoid situations
which would imply recognition extends to economic relation-
ships between the South African authorities and third states.
2 37
The majority opinion limited the duty of non-recognition where
the effect would be to harm the interests of the inhabitants
of Namibia:
. . . while official acts performed by the
Government of South Africa on behalf of or
concerning Namibia after the termination of
the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this
invalidity cannot be extended to those acts,
such as, for instance, the registration of
births, deaths and marriages, the effect
which can be ignored only to the detriment
of the inhabitants of the Territory.23
8
232. See generall I.C.J. Stat. Art. 38; H. Steiner &
D. Vagts, supra note 161 at 135-274; Hevener, "The 1971
South-West African Opinion - A New International Juridical
Philosophy," 24 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 791 (1975).
233. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
423, 450-3 (1964); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). See
H. Steiner & D. Vagts, supra note 161, at 426-46; see generally
Morgenstern, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Legisla-
tive and Judicial Acts Which are Contrary to International Law,"
4 Int'l L.Q. 326 (1951).
234. Namibia Opinion 54; I. Brownlie, supra note 11, at
502-3.
235. Namibia Opinion 55.
236. Id. 55, 58; S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1529th
meeting 12,5-T1970).
237. Namibia Opinion 55-6.
238. Id. 56.
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The opinion thus limited the duty of non-recognition to acts
undertaken after the termination of the Mandate. The majority
opinion did not deal with entitlements such as concessions or
licenses concerning natural resources. Separate opinions in
the Namibia case implied that the majority position would reach
Investments in Namibia.239
United Nations resolutions have further clarified the
obligation imposed in the Namibia opinion. Security Council
Res. 283 (1970) dealt prospectively with private investment
in Namibia. The resolution called upon states to discour-
age future economic activity in Namibia and to terminate ex-
isting investments.240 In Resolution 301 (1971), the Security
Council took the additional step of declaring that all ".
franchises, rights, titles or contracts relating to Namibla
granted to individuals or companies by South Africa after the
adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) are not sub-
ject to protection or espousal by their States against claims
of a future lawful Government of Namibla.'2 4 1 Finally, General
Assembly Res. 3295 (XXIX) requested member states ensure com-
pliance with the Council for Namibia's Decree on Natural re-
sources.2
42
According to United Nations resolutions, economic rights
239. Id. 97-8 (sep.op.Ammoun), 120 (sep.op.Padilla
Nervo), 135-6-Tsep.op.Petr~n), 218-9 (sep.op.de Castro). Four
judges indicated that the United Nations resolution may Impose
duties which go beyond the normal effects of non-recognition.
Id.- 134-7 (sep.op.Petren); 148 (sep.op.Owyeama); 165 (sep.op.
Dillard); 297 (diss.op. Fitzmaurice); I. Brownlie, supra note
11 at 503 n.3. The legal consequences are remarkably similar
to economic sanctions. Id. 503 n.2; Rovine, supra note 70, at
232; see McDougal & Reisma-n, supra note 20, at 3. In that
connection, note TAN 99-100 supra.
240. 25 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 16 (1970). Although
not discussed in the majority opinion, several judges in the
Namibia case believed that Res. 283 required states not to
recognize the validity of concessions granted by South Africa.
Namibia Opinion 55, 120 (sep.op.Padilla Nervo), 134-7 (sep.
op.Petr~n).
241. 26 U.N. SCOR, 1598th meeting 7 (1971). The reso-
lution is identical to United States policy. TAN 93 supra.
242. G.A. Res. 3295, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 106,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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derived from the South African administration since 1966 are
invalid. Resolution 3295 (XXIX) does not necessarily affect
interests created before the termination of the Mandate.
That resolution approves the Council's Decree. The opera-
tive sections of the Decree are not explicitly restricted to
interests created after 1966. However, the preface to the
Decree takes note of resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 224 8(s-v) as
well as the Namibla opinion.243 Since the prior resolutions
and the advisory opinion do not invalidate acts of South Af-
rica under the Mandate, the preface could be interpreted as a
limit on the broader claims in the operative sections of the
Decree. In any event, resolution 3295 (XXIX) does not ex-
plicitly reach beyond prior resolutions. The resolutions are
particularly authoritative, since they deal with self-
determination for Namibia. The International Court confirmed
the competence of the United Nations to issue binding resolu-
tions in this area.2 44 Furthermore, the United States re-
gards General Assembly resolutions as evidence of customary
international law if they receive universal support and are
observed by states.245
United States policy toward Namibia supports the con-
clusion that licenses or concessions granted by South Africa
after termination of the Mandate are not valid. The United
States has accepted the Namibia opinion. The executive
branch has adopted a policy based on non-recognition, and has
described the South African control of Namibia as an "illegal
occupation. '2 46 In presentations before the International
Court in the Namibia case, the United States argued that the
duty of non-recognition should not extend to official acts
concerning births, deaths or marriages. In such situations
non-recognition could harm the inhabitants of Namibia. The
test of invalidity is thus potential for harm to the residents
of the territory.247 The United States also voted for Security
243. See Appendix, Infra.
244. Note, "Self-Determination and the Namibia Opin-
ions," 548-54; TAN 54-60.
245. 69 Am. J. Int'l L. 863 (1975) (letter from
Stephen M. Schwebel, Dep. Legal Advisor, Department of State,
to Marcus G. Raskin).
246. TAN 87-90 supra.
247. Written Statement of the United States of America,
1 Namibia Opinion, t.C.J. Pleadings 883 (1970); Oral Statement
of the United States, 2 Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings 503
(1970).
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Council Resolutions 283 (1970) and 301 (197).248 General As-
sembly Res. 3295 (XXIX) did not receive United States support.
United States opposition to Res. 3295 (XXIX) did not imply op-
position to the Decree. The State Department has merely de-
clined comment on the merits of the Decree.249 The clearest
indication yet of American policy on the legality of economic
interests granted by South Africa has been presented in state-
ments concerning American investment in Namibia. The United
States announced that it would not assist in protecting Amer-
ican Investments undertaken after the end of the Mandate
against claims of a future government of Namibia. 250 This pol-
icy strongly implies the illegality of such investments.
An administrative act of South Africa in Namibia could
be characterized as an act purportedly having extraterritorial
effect or as the act of an unrecognized regime. United States
courts have followed similar rules in both cases. The courts
will enforce foreign acts affecting extraterritorial in-
terests only if the result would be consistent with United
States law and policy.2 5 1 Several cases have indicated that
the acts of an unrecognized regime will not be enforced.
252
248. Bennett, Statement, 65 Dep't State Bull. 609
(1971); Buffum, Statement,63 Dep't State Bull. 254 (1970).
249. Davis, sup note 82, at 37-8; TAN 103-107 supra.
250. TAN 94-6.
251. Restatement 943 (2), comments e,f; see e.g. Re-
public of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F-2d-- (2d
Cir. 1965); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.
1956); Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath,
188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951); The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d
Cir. 1944); Menzel v. List, 49 Misc.2d 300, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966).
252. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v.
McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951); The Haret, 145 F.2d
431 (3d Cir. 1944); Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line
v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 717, 126 Ct. Cl. 802 (1953);
Estonian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United States,
116 F. Supp. 447, 126 Ct. Cl. 809 (1953); see A/S Merilaid &
Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Co. 1947). In Adams v. Adams, [1970] 3 All E.R. 572,
583-5, the English Court of Appeals went so far as to refuse
to recognize a divorce granted by a judge who took office in
accordance with a decree of the unrecognized Rhodesian regime.
The case is an extreme and unwarranted application of non-
recognition doctrine.
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These cases involved nationalization decrees by the unrecog-
nized Estonian and Latvian governments. Non-recognition of
the governments was not the only expression of policy that
influenced the courts. The United States government re-
fused to recognize the specific decrees at issue.2 53 How-
ever, the extreme position enunciated in those cases has not
been persuasive.254 Courts have indicated a willingness to
enforce acts of an unrecognized regime which essentially in-
volve private transactions and are not contrary to United
States public policy.25 5 Thus, regardless of how a court
characterizes the South African administration, licenses and
concessions pertaining to Namibian natural resources would be
open to attack on the grounds that they are public acts con-
trary to United States policy and international law.
The Supreme Court provided further guidance for deter-
mining the validity of acts done by illegal governments In
cases dealing with the Confederacy.25 6 The Court outlined its
approach to de facto illegal governments in Texas v. White.2 57
The case involved Texas laws designed to help finance the war
against the United States. The Court held that the govern-
ment was unlawful. However, not all acts of the government
were invalid:
It may be said, perhaps with sufficient ac-
curacy, that acts necessary to peace and good
order among citizens, such for example, as acts
253. This explanation still does not account for dicta
in the cases. See Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Lines
v. McGrath, 188-.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1951); The Maret,
145 F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944).
254. See H. Brlggs, supra note 129, at 168-70; Adler,
supra note 125, at 79-51.
255. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena,
293 F. Supp. 892, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Sokoloff v. National
City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 165 (1924); Upright v. Mercury Business
Machines, 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dept. 1961);
see cases cited in notes 257, 260 infra; cf. M. Salimoff & Co.
v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 270,7T--N.E. 679 (1933). The
cases are di'scussed in Lubman, supra note 131, passim; 12 Colum.
J. Transnat'l L. 155, 158-61, l-64'(0973). This rule presumes
effective control. Restatement §113. Note that foreign con-
cessions in Namibia would not fulfill the conditions of §113(b),
although §113(a) would apply.
256. Lubman, supra note 131, at 292-3.
257. 74 U.S.. (7 Wal1.) 700 (1868).
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sanctioning and protecting marriage and the
domestic relations, governing the course of
descents, regulating the conveyance and
transfer of property, real and personal, and
providing remedies for injuries to person and
estate, and other similar acts, which would
be valid if emanating from a lawful govern-
ment, must be regarded In general as valid
when proceeding from an actual, though un-
lawful government; and that acts in further-
ance or support of rebellion against the
United States, or intended to defeat the
just rights of citizens, and other acts of
like nature, must, in general, be regarded
as invalid and void.259
According to this rule, acts which were intimately related to
the illegal character of the government or violated public
policy259 were invalid.260 United States courts have followed
similar rules In other cases involving occupation of territory
during war.261 In the case of Namibia, the termination of the
South African Mandate resulted from the denial of human rights
and the exploitation of the territory.262 Entitlements granted
to investors support the illegal South African administration
and help to perpetuate the abuses of the Mandate.263 Licenses
and concessions are not merely means of regulating transac-
tions between private parties. Such agreements directly in-
volve South Africa in the economic life of Namibia, and that
involvement is illegal. The agreements furthermore are not
in conformity with United States public policy.264
258. Id. 733.
259. See Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158,
165 (1924).
260. Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878); Dewing v.
Perdicaries, 96 U.S. 193 (1877); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S.
176 (1877); United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.)
99 (1875); Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall), 459
(18741; Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.), 540 (1873);
Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.), 342 (1870); Thorington v.
Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall ), 1 (1868); but see Baldy v. Hunter,
171 U.S. 388 (1898).
261. See 6 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 76-88
(1968).
262. TAN 6, 31 supra.
263. See e.g. "Report of the United Nations Council for
Namibia,1 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/9024 (1974).
264. TAN 246-50.
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VI. The Status of Claims by the Council for Namibia
The preceding analysis focused on the legality of eco-
nomic grants from South Africa. In order to gain possession
of contested property, it is not sufficient to merely demon-
strate the defects in another party's title. The Council would
have to show that its right to the natural resources is super-
ior. The bases of the Council's claims are, of course, the
resolutions which have transferred responsibility for Namibia
to the United Nations and have defined the powers of the Coun-
cil.2 65 In general, the reasons for finding South African con-
cessions in Namibia illegal would also support the claims by
the Council. However, while United States policy supports the
conclusion that the concessions are illegal, American policy
has not accepted the legislative or administrative competence
of the Council in all situations.2 66 The United States, when
abstaining on Resolution 2248 (s-v) creating the Council, took
the position that the Council should be limited to those func-
tions the exercise of which were within its actual capacity.267
Since enforcement of the Decree does not depend on control of
the territory, this legislative act by the Council presumably
does not constitute an example of an impractical allocation of
competence.
Resolution 2248 (s-v) enumerated powers of the Council
which were "to be discharged in the territory.''268 The United
States has interpreted this Phrase to delay the exercise of the
administrative powers until the Council is in control of the
territory.2 69 Regarding the Decree the United States has not
Indicated whether the enactment of the Decree constitutes an
exercise of such powers.270
The exact extent of the Council's competence to legis-
late for the territory may not be entirely free of some am-
biquity. The General Assembly's approval of the Decree in
Resolution 3295 (XXIX) supports the Council's claim to Re-
sponsibility for Namibian Territory.27 1 While there were no
265. TAN 48-69 supra; Lauterpacht, supra note 2, at
63-4.
266. TAN 101-4 supra.
267. Davis, supra note 82, at 38.
268. 5th Sp. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. I, at 1, U.N. Doe.
A/6657 (1967).
269. Davis, supra note 82, at 38.
270. See 29 U.N. GAOR, Fourth Committee 236, U.N. Doc.
A/C.4/SR.2078--2131 (1974).
271. 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 106, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
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votes against the resolution in the General Assembly or the
Fourth Committee which submitted a draft to the main body,
there were fifteen abstentions on the final vote and fourteen
on the draft. The abstaining countries expressed doubt that
the Council had the power to issue the Decree, either because
it exceeded the powers granted by the General Assembly or be-
cause it lacked territorial sovereignty.2 72 The United States
delegate did not indicate such reservations in explaining her
country's abstention.2 7 3
In the Decree on Natural Resources, the Council as-
serted claims with respect to three classes of property:
natural resources acquired on the basis of concessions grant-
ed after the termination of the Mandate, natural resources
associated with pre-termination concessions, and any vehicle,
ship or container used in the transportation of disputed re-
sources. Furthermore, it is asserted that parties that thwart
the alms of the Decree might be liable for damaqes to a future
government of Namibia.274 Adjudication of the merits of claims
to resources acquired under entitlements qranted after the
revocation of the Mandate should not present a major difficulty
from the perspective of international law and American policy:
the Council merely asserts the right to possess property held
by the defendant on the basis of the illegal South African
grant. The remaining claims apparently have little support in
United Nations resolutions or United States policy state-
ments.2 75 Assuming the legality of the South African admin-
istration prior to the termination of the Mandate, the claim
to resources from pre-termination concessions can be charac-
terized as the expropriation of property without compensation.
Such takings are deemed violations of international law and
are certainly against United States policy.276 Regardless of
the status of the Council, this type of claim probably would
not be enforced in United States courts. Moreover, the Coun-
cil's claims regarding the means of transporting the resources
and damages may run afoul of the established rule against the
272. 29 U.N. GAOR, Fourth Committee 233-7, U.N. Doc.
A/C.4/SR. 2078-2131 (1974).
273. Id. 236.
274. i'Rtural Resources Decree 4F2,5,6.
275. But see G.A. Res. 3295, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at
106, 4 IV-7, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
276. See e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272
F. Supp. 836 TSTD.N.Y. 1965); Libyan Hot Oil Statement, s
note 186 at 771, 774, 776, 779.
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enforcement of foreign penal and revenue laws in United States
courts.277
VII. Evaluation and Recommendations
The continued presence of South Africa In Namibia ap-
parently presents the world community with the alternatives of
peace or justice.276 While significant obstacles exist, the
strategy of seeking implementation of international prescrip-
tions on Namibia by recourse to national courts, constitutes
another option open to the world community. This alternative
could decisively influence the course of events in which the
requirements both of justice in Namibia and of the main-
tenance of international peace and security would be met.
The Illegality of South Africa's administration has been
clearly established. However, virtually universal recognition
of this fact has not been able to bring about an end to the con-
tinued violation of human rights in this area and the denial of
the right of self-determination to the inhabitants of the ter-
ritory. The potential for violence and outside intervention
has increased.2 7 9  In this situation enforcement of the Council
of Namibia's Decree on Natural Resources, even If limited to
entitlement grants after termination of the mandate, provides
a possible escape from the dilemma, since litigation could help
277. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
413-4 (1964). The claim to the means of transportation can also
be analyzed as an expropriation without compensation.
278. See Dugard, "Namibia (South West Africa): The
Courts' Opinion, South Africa's Response, and Prospects for the
Future," 11 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 14, 46 (1972); Murphey,
"Whither Now Namibia?," 6 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1, 36 (1972). For
a survey of various alternatives, see A. Obozuwa, supra note 33,
at 165-201.
279. Kaufman, "In South-West Africa the Big Question Is
Whether Change Will Come in Time," N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1976,
at 8, col. 3:
Since the involvement of Cubans and Russians in
the Angolan war, the dominant question here
[Namibia] has been not whether social and politi-
cal change will come to this sparsely populated
territory administered by South Africa, but how
it can be effected before there is armed conflict.
Kaufman reported that the prospects for peaceful settlement
were not good. See Kaufman, "South Africa Sees Hope of Angola
Understanding," id., Feb. 20, 1976, at 8, cols. 3-4.
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to end the illeQal occupation of Namibia by peaceful means. In
any event, it would contribute to accelerating the termination
of South African control over Namibia and possibly decreasing
the extent of coercion that ultimately may be necessary to
achieve this goal.
Law suits by the Council would require minimal involve-
ment by other states, certainly less than would be required to
make economic sanctions such as boycotts effective.280 Exten-
sive litigation could, of course, cause some disruption of in-
ternational economic transactions. However, the probability
that reasonable investors would perceive the risks of commit-
ments in Namibia after termination of the Mandate should miti-
gate the detrimental effects. United States investment pol-
icy has made the risks even clearer. Furthermore, the wide-
spread consensus regarding the illegality of South Africa's
presence in Namibia reduces the possibility of inconsistent
decisions by United States and foreign courts. Moreover, sta-
bility in expectations about the world economy would be better
served by effective international law, i.e.,by prescriptions
whose enforcement is reasonably certain.281 In sum, enforce-
ment of the Decree in United States courts would be in con-
formity with the interests of the international community
and the United States.
In order to facilitate litigation, the United States
should clarify its policy toward the Council for Namibia.2
82
The United States could extend at least limited recognition
to the Council.2 83 Recognition of the Council as the govern-
ment of Namibia would, to be sure, constitute a departure
280. Cf. TAN 99-100.
281. c-Dougal, supra note 157, at 335-9, 351-9; 12
Harv. Int'l L.J. 557, 55-_T971); see Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (19-M).
282. See generally "Hearings on Critical Developments
in Namibia" I-2, 21-4, 32-3; E. Landis, "Namibia the Begin-
nings of Disengagement" 2 Studies in Race & Nations Center on
Int'l Relations 9-34 (1970); E. Landis, American Responsibili-
ties vis-a-vis Namibia, Nov., 1971 (paper presented at 14th
Annual Meeting, African Studies Association); but see Kermnan,
"Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," 49 Foreign Affairs 218,
227-30 (1971).
283. This has been previously suggested in "Hearings
on Critical Developments in Namibia" 23 (testimony of Eliza-
beth Landis).
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from alleged prerequisites for recognition such as effective
control over a territory and population.284 But as practice
has shown in the past, recognition decisions are not deter-
mined by rigid formalities sometimes claimed to be applicable
to the relationship between recognizing and recognized gov-
ernments prior to the act of recognition. For example, the
United States currently recognizes three governments in exile
(those of the Baltic states),285 and during World War II ex-
tended limited recognition to the French Committee of National
Liberation and the Netherlands and Belgium governments in
exile.2
86
Recognition ultimately depends on the §ffect of the de-
cision on American foreign policy interests.
2 B 7 In the case
of Namibia, recognition of the Council could help to brinq
about a peaceful end to flagrant human rights violations.
The decision to recognize would not run counter to the ex-
pressed goals of United States policy. Indeed, while a gen-
eral policy of recognizing national liberation movements could
be disruptive to United States interests, the Namibia situ-
ation is unique. United States policy that might frustrate
the Council could in the long run result in the very damage
to United States foreign interests--world peace and economic
stability--which accounts for the reluctance to embrace a gen-
eral recognition policy in favor of liberation movements.
Recognition of the Council would have two beneficial
effects on litigation to enforce the Decree. First, it would
ensure access to United States courts.2
8 8 Second, the claims
of the Council would be reinforced by recognition, especially
if the United States takes a favorable position on the Decree.
284. Restatement 9§10-103, 2 Whiteman, Digest of Inter-
national Law 68-119 (1963); cf. Lubman, supra note 131, passim.
On the consequences of premature recognition, see Restatement
§§96,99.
285. "Hearings on S. Res. 205" at 21-2.
286. 2 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 129-30,
715-21 (1963).
287. "Hearings on S. Res. 205" at 8-10; Schwebel,
"'Cognition' and the Peking Visit - Is Recognition of Govern-
ments Obsolete?" in N. Leech, C. Oliver & J. Sweeney, Cases and
Materials on the International Legal System 817-20 (1973
288. TAN 108-44 supra.
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The State Department could presumably limit application of the
Decree to concessions granted after the termination of the man-
date.289 A pertinent case in this context is the issuance by
the Netherlands qovernment in exile of a Decree that vested in
that government title to property located in America and origi-
nally owned by residents of the occupied Netherlands. The
Decree was intended to preserve the rights of these Dutch
subjects during the war. The State Department specifically
endorsed the enforcement of the Decree within the United
States. Accordingly, courts gave effect to the Decree.
2 9 0
The nature of the Council for Namibia is similar to that of
a government in exile. Recognition and enforcement of the
decrees of such an entity would therefore not be unprecedented.
Enforcement of the Council's Decree entails the resolu-
tion of international law issues. The Sabbatino formulation
of the act of state doctrine prevents examination of acts' con-
trary to international law in cases where the doctrine ap-
plies. The Council can reasonably argue that the doctrine
does not apply due to the extraterritoriality and unrecognized
regime exceptions.29 1 Although there are persuasive reasons
allowing domestic courts to rule on violations of international
law, the Supreme Court has not overruled Sabbatino.29 2 Since
the Council might not evade the doctrine by virtue of the two
exceptions, the State Department should be willing to write a
Bernstein letter. The justifications for a permissive posi-
tion have been discussed previously.2 9 3 The current State
Department position Is apparently receptive to litigation by
the Council.29
4
The Council seeks to invalidate title to resources de-
rived from South Africa and to be placed in possession.
289. See Telegram from the Secretary of State to Am-
bassador in Japan, [1915] 15 Foreign Rel. U.S. 146 (1924); 2
Whiteman, Digest of International Law 132-3 (19631.
290. State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank,
201 F.2d 455, 463 (2d Cir. 1953) (indicating that recognition
of the government was sufficient); State of the Netherlands v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 79 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Anderson
v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d
502 (1942).
291. TAN 199-214.
292. McDougal, supra note 157, passim.
293. TAN 180-98.
294. Oral Statement of the United States, 2 Namibia
Opinion, I.C.J. Pleadings 503 (1970); Davis, supra note 82, at
37-8.
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Lower court opinions in the Sabbatino litigation indicated that
invalidation of title and specific restitution are available
remedies when nationalizations violate international law.29 5
Those remedies have been applied by foreign tribunals in
similar situations.296 The Namibia controversy does not in-
volve nationalization or confiscation of property by South
Africa. But remedies should not be limited to that particular
type of violation of international law.29 7
The significance of successful litigation enforcing the
Decree on Natural Resources would lie in demonstrating the vi-
ability of national courts as international enforcement agen-
cies. In the Namibia controversy, national courts provide a
means for giving effect to authoritative decisions of the
United Nations without resort to violence. Thus, adoption of
this enforcement strategy will reinforce the international
legal system and thereby promote world peace.
295. N. Leech, C. Oliver & J. Sweeney, supra note 280,
at 442-3.
296. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate (the "Rose
Mary"), [1953] I.L.R. 316 (Sup. Ct. Aden 1953); see Bank of
Indonesia v. Senembah Maatschappij and Twentsche Bank, 30 I.L.R.
28 (Ct. of Appeals, Amsterdam 1959); Confiscation of Property of
Sudeten Germans Case, [1948] Ann. Dig. 24 (Amtsgencht of)
Dingolfing, Germany 1948); Soci~te Potasas lbericas v. Block,
[1938-403 Ann. Dig. 150 (Ct. of Cassation, France 1939); Moulin
v. Volatron, [1935-37] Ann. Dig. 191 (Commercial Tribunal of
Marseilles, France 1937); The "Ropit," [1927-28] Ann. Dig. 67
(Ct. of Cassation, France 1928).
297. Cf. Schwebel, "Speculations on Specific Performance
of a Contract Between a State and a Foreign National," in Rights
and Duties of Private Investors Abroad 201 (1965).
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APPENDIX
Source: Addendum to the Report of the United Nations
Council for Namlbia, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24A,"
at 27-8, U.N. Doc. A/9624/Add. 1 (1975)
Decree on the Natural Resources of Nambia
Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural re-
sources of the people of Namibia and of ensuring that these
natural resources are not exploited to the detriment of Namibia,
its people or environmental assets, the United Nations Council
for Namibla enacts the following decree:
DECREE
The United Nations Council for Namibia,
Reconlzin that, in the terms of General Assembly resolu-
tion 2145 (Xl of 27 October 1966, the Territory of Namibia
(formerly South West Africa) is the direct responsibility of the
United Nations,
Accepting that this responsibility includes the obliga-
tion to support the right of the people of Namibia to achieve
self-government and independence in accordance with General As-
sembly resolution 514 (xv) of 14 December 1960,
Reaffirming that the Government of the Republic of South
Africa is In illegal possession of the Territory of Namibia,
Furthering the decision of the General Assembly In reso-
lution 1803(XVII) of 14 December 1962, which declared the right
of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natu-
ral wealth and resources,
Noting that the Government of the Republic of South Africa
has usurped and Interfered with these rights,
Desirous of securing for the people of Namibia adequate
protection of the natural wealth and resources of the Territory
which is rightfully theirs,
Recalling the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,
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Acting in terms of the powers conferred on it by the
General Assembly under resolution 2248(S-V), of 19 May 1967,
and all other relevant resolutions and decisions regarding
Namibia,
Decrees that:
1. No person or entity, whether a body corporate or un-
incorporated, may search for, prospect for, explore for, take,
extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, export, or dis-
tribute any natural resource, whether animal or mineral, situ-
ated or found to be situated within the territorial limits of
Namibia without the consent and permission of the United Na-
tions Council for Namibia or any person authorized to act on
its behalf for the purpose of giving such permission or such
consent;
2. Any permission, concession or licence for all or
any of the purpose specified in paragraph 1 above whensoever
granted by any person or entity, including any body purporting
to act under the authority of the Government of the Republic of
South Africa or the "Administration of South West Africa" or
their predecessors, is null, void and of no force or effect;
3. No animal resource, mineral, or other natural re-
source produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia
may be taken from the said Territory by any means whatsoever
to any place whatsoever outside the territorial limits of
Namibia by any person or body, whether corporate or unincor-
porated, without the consent and permission of the United Na-
tions Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act
on behalf of the said Council;
4. Any animal, mineral or other natural resource pro-
duced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia, which
shall be taken from the said Territory without the consent and
written authority of the United Nations Council for Namibia
or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Coun-
cil, may be seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the
said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the
people of Namibia;
5. Any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying
animal, mineral or other natural resources produced in or
emanating from the Territory of Namibia shall also be subject
to seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf of the United Na-
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tions Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act
on behalf of the said Council and shall be forfeited to the
benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the
benefit of the people of Namibia;
6. Any person, entity or corporation which contravenes
the present decree in respect of Nanlibia may be held liable for
damages by the future Government of an independent Namibia;
7. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 to 5 above and in
order to give effect to this decree, the United Nations Coun-
cil for Namibia hereby authorizes the United Nations Commission-
er for Namibla, in accordance with General Assembly resolution
2248 (S-V), to take the necessary steps after consultations
with the President.
